

ONE

Doing Things with Words and Saying Words with Things

That things we say and do through the Internet have permeated our lives in unprecedented ways is now a cliché that needs not repeating. That this has happened practically throughout the world despite a digital divide is also accepted. That both corporations and states have become heavily invested in harvesting, assembling, and storing data—for profits or security—about things we say and do through the Internet is practically the strongest evidence of the significance attached to our connected digital lives. That for many people Aaron Swartz, Anonymous, DDoS, Edward Snowden, GCHQ, Julian Assange, LulzSec, NSA, Pirate Bay, PRISM, or WikiLeaks hardly require introduction is yet further evidence. That presidents and footballers tweet, hackers leak nude photos, and murderers and advertisers use Facebook or that people post their sex acts are not so controversial as just recognizable events of our times. That Airbnb disrupts the hospitality industry or Uber the taxi industry is taken for granted. It certainly feels like saying and doing things through the Internet has become an everyday experience with dangerous possibilities.

The worldwide debate over the social, economic, and cultural consequences of digital life connected to the Internet has been in full swing for about twenty years now.¹ Early and notable books such as Sherry Turkle's *Life on the Screen* (1995) and Nicholas Negroponte's *Being Digital* (1995) were by and large celebrations of digital lives being connected to the Internet and enabling people to do things through it.² Yet within twenty years the mood has decisively changed. Evgeny Morozov's *The*

Net Delusion (2011), Turkle's own *Alone Together* (2011), or Jamie Bartlett's *The Dark Net* (2014) strike much more sombre, if not worried, moods. While Morozov draws attention to the consequences of giving up data in return for so-called free services, Turkle draws attention to how people are getting lost in their devices. Bartlett draws attention to what is happening in certain areas of the Internet when pushed underground (removed from access via search engines) and thus giving rise to new forms of vigilantism and extremism. Perhaps the spying and snooping by corporations and states into what people say and do through the Internet has become a watershed event.³ Seen from another angle, novels such as William Gibson's *Neuromancer* (1984) and Dave Eggers's *The Circle* (2013) practically bookmark an era. While Gibson projects an experimental and explorative, if not separate and independent, cyberspace, almost like a frontier, Eggers announces the arrival of the guardians at the gates of the frontier. As Ronald Deibert recently suggested, while the Internet used to be characterized as a network of networks it is perhaps more appropriate now to see it as a network of filters and chokepoints.⁴ The struggle over the things we say and do through the Internet is now a political struggle of our times, and so is the Internet itself.

If indeed what we are saying *and* doing through the Internet is dramatically changing political life, what then of the subjects of politics? If the Internet—or, more precisely, how we are increasingly acting *through* the Internet—is changing our political subjectivity, what do we think about the way in which we understand ourselves as political subjects, subjects who have rights to speech, access, and privacy, rights that constitute us as political, as beings with responsibilities and obligations? Like those who approach the study of the Internet as remaking social networks, identities, subjectivities, or human-technology interactions, we are interested in how the Internet involves the refashioning of relations not only between people but between people and vast arrangements of technologies and conventions that have become part of everyday language, such as tweeting, messaging, friending, emailing, blogging, sharing, and so on. We are specifically interested in the consequences of these conventions for political life, which we think is being reconfigured in novel ways. Moreover, with the development of the Internet of things—*our* phones, watches, dishwashers, fridges, cars, and many other devices being always already connected to the Internet—we not only do things with words but also do words with things. (We are going to elaborate on this

awkward but necessary phrase 'saying and doing things through the Internet' and its two sides, 'doing things with words' and 'saying words with things,' in chapters 2 and 3 when we discuss the figures of the citizen and cyberspace and then speech acts and digital acts.) These connected devices generate enormous volumes of data about our movements, locations, activities, interests, encounters, and private and public relationships through which we become data subjects. When joined up with other data collected by private or public authorities concerning our taxes, health, passport, travel, and finance, the data profiles that can be compiled about people is staggering.⁵ Who owns the data generated by the digital traces of people and their devices?⁶ The Internet has not only permeated our social, cultural, and economic lives but also resignified political life by creating an interconnected web of relations among people and things. It has influenced almost every aspect of politics, and its presence in politics is ubiquitous. It has created new kinds of politics where there is ostensibly no previous equivalent. It has also given rise to new subjects of politics such as Anonymous, cypherpunks, hacktivists, and whistle-blowers.

Along with these political subjects, a new designation has also emerged: digital citizens. Subjects such as citizen journalists, citizen artists, citizen scientists, citizen philanthropists, and citizen prosecutors have variously accompanied it.⁷ Going back to the euphoric years of the 1990s, Jon Katz introduced the term to describe generally the kinds of Americans who were active on the Internet.⁸ For Katz, people were inventing new ways of conducting themselves politically on the Internet and were transcending the straitjacket of at least American electoral politics caught, as it were, between conventional Democratic versus Republican party politics. Considering this as the birth of a new political subjectivity entirely owing to the Internet, Katz thought that although digital citizens were libertarian, they were neither alienated nor isolated. Rather, digital citizens were a political movement struggling to come together with a common cause mobilized by values of sharing, prosperity, exchange, knowledge, and openness.⁹ Katz's optimism has not been entirely borne out by our subsequent (and international) experience.¹⁰ A recent website, for example, calling on people to become digital citizens seems to be more about personal safety and personal security than Katz's libertarian political subjects dedicated to openness and sharing.¹¹ It promises, for example, that through becoming digital citizens you will 'learn how

to protect yourself and your family. Be a voice for real solutions. Help us take our online neighbourhood back from the criminals and predators.’ As this signals, these different imaginaries of being or becoming digital citizens are contested. This contestation is not entirely a product of the Internet, as we shall see later, and perhaps expresses the paradox of the late modern citizen with conflicting and ambiguous callings.¹² The question that we face in relation to this contestation or struggle as both an object of theorizing and of politics is: What kind of political subject, if not a citizen, is coming into being through the Internet? What are the callings that mobilize people with ever more force to become digital citizens, and what are the closings that generate dread and motivate them to withdraw?

In posing these questions our focus is thus on the political subject that arises from acting through the Internet. To state from the outset, we understand the political subject not as a coherent and unified being but as a composite of multiple subjectivities that emerge from different situations and relations. We ask how it is possible for political subjects to make rights claims about how their digital lives are configured, regulated, and organized by dispersed arrangements of numerous people and things such as corporations and states but also software and devices as well as people such as programmers and regulators. This question concerns not only by now well-known activists who are mostly male and Euro-American but also the innumerable and often anonymous subjects whose everyday acts through the Internet make claims to its workings and rules. And as we have already suggested in the questions raised above, how these everyday acts come to produce a political subjectivity that we call digital citizens is our central concern. We have already implied two key ideas of this book; let us now specify them.

First, by bringing the political subject to the centre of concern, we interfere with determinist analyses of the Internet and hyperbolic assertions about its impact that imagine subjects as passive *data subjects*. Instead, we attend to how political subjectivities are always performed in relation to sociotechnical arrangements to then think about how they are brought into being through the Internet.¹³ We also interfere with libertarian analyses of the Internet and their hyperbolic assertions of *sovereign subjects*. We contend that if we shift our analysis from how we are being ‘controlled’ (as both determinist and libertarian views agree) to the complexities of ‘acting’—by foregrounding *citizen subjects* not in isolation but

in relation to the arrangements of which they are a part—we can identify ways of being not simply obedient and submissive but also subversive. While usually reserved for high-profile hacktivists and whistle-blowers, we ask, how do subjects act in ways that transgress the expectations of and go beyond specific conventions and in doing so make rights claims about how to conduct themselves as digital citizens?¹⁴ Second, by focusing on how digital citizens make rights claims through the Internet, we ask, how are their relations mediated, regulated, and monitored, and how is knowledge generated, ordered, and disseminated through the Internet? We consider both of these concerns as objects of struggle and ones through which we might identify how we *otherwise* conduct ourselves as digital citizens when we engage *with* others and act through the Internet.

When the sociotechnical arrangements and subjects that make up the Internet traverse not only national borders but also legal orders, both borders and orders become permeable *and* reinforced simultaneously. The implications of this are evident in struggles over the Internet; from Anonymous to WikiLeaks, from activists to security professionals alike, acts can and do cut across national borders and multiple legal orders.¹⁵ Some of the Internet's novel aspects, such as the speed and reach of interactions and transactions, have spurred concerns about high-frequency trading, the hacking of financial and banking services, state and corporate spying on citizens, deliberate cross-border virus attacks, covert cyberwars among states, and the rise of often anonymous racism, xenophobia, and homophobia along with cyberbullying and issues of freedom of speech. These are just a few prominent issues of how technical, material, cultural, ethical, and political matters collide and collude across multiple and overlapping orders.¹⁶ The challenge we set for ourselves in this book is to find ways of investigating how people enact themselves as citizens by negotiating their rights such as privacy, access, openness, and innovation and their rights concerning data. We investigate these rights not in terms of their substance but in relation to who the subject is of these rights, or more precisely, who is constituting themselves as political subjects of these rights by saying and doing things—and thus making rights claims—through the Internet.

BETWEEN DIGITAL LIFE AND POLITICAL LIFE

So far there has been a remarkably limited discussion, let alone theorization, of the relationship between citizens and the Internet.¹⁷ It has been limited in two senses. First, discussions of the relationship have focused on issues concerning the provision and delivery of public services through the Internet, variously described as e-government and measured by indicators such as the United Nations e-government readiness index or other indices and metrics.¹⁸ This is also the case for studies of government transparency and citizen rights to open data that have led to initiatives such as the G8 Open Data Charter.¹⁹ Although open data and the provision and delivery of public services through the Internet are important aspects of contemporary citizenship, to limit citizenship to these meanings is obviously too narrow for understanding various broader, if not fundamental, issues we have just mentioned. Second, those who consider such broad issues that we discuss under the rubric of 'digital citizens' seem to overlook how citizenship itself in contemporary societies is undergoing fundamental changes that are related to a series of other transformations similar to and different from those concerning the Internet. The issues of transnational mobility and migrations, resurgence of nationalism, assertions of sovereignty, internationalization of capital, the decline of the social state, and the rise of neoliberalism are all forcing the boundaries of citizenship as an issue of concern. Just as the extensity of the Internet enables digital life to flow across state regulatory jurisdictions, so too do the rights claims of citizens increasingly traverse multiple legal orders.

To an extent, these issues are now being addressed in the field of digital studies.²⁰ Questions concerning who shapes the Internet, who uses it, and who shapes law and regulation regarding it are now being debated. It is well recognized that digital studies concerns itself with not only underlying digital technologies but how these technologies are embedded in sociotechnical arrangements and subjects who shape these arrangements both as users and producers. More significantly, digital studies spans both social sciences and humanities as well as science and technology studies and asks questions concerning the relation of digital technologies to social and cultural change. For Arthur and Marilouise Kroker especially, critical digital studies revisits the question concerning technology and its embodiment in political, social, and cultural lives.²¹ For Krok-

er and Kroker 'What is truly *critical* about critical digital studies is the emphasis on not only understanding the dominant codes of technology, politics, and culture in the digital era but also on digital studies that excel in breaking the codes and in introducing new visions of the digital future by disrupting the codes, disturbing boundaries, and adding uncertainty to established patterns of (code) behaviour.'²² As we shall see in chapter 6, breaking codes or conventions is an essential aspect of the performativity of digital acts, and hence being critical is inherent in a performative understanding of acts.

If indeed we want to engage with critical digital studies concerning the connectivity of people and things through the Internet, our premise is that even in critical digital studies that explore 'the politics of the Internet', the figure of the citizen makes a faint appearance. As we explain below, we do not mean that either the term 'citizens' or 'citizenship' is absent from digital studies. On the contrary, since the 1990s, the terms 'citizens' and 'citizenship' have been used to describe politics of and on the Internet. The question is, rather, concerned with the faint appearance of the figure of the citizen as a subject making rights claims. A brief survey of exceptions to this absence will help us explain what we mean by this.

An early work by Kevin Hill and John Hughes, *Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet* (1998), explores the role and impact of the Internet on democratic politics in America.²³ Hill and Hughes conclude that 'politics on the Internet is dominated by a relatively savvy, conservative minority', and perhaps for this reason, 'the Internet is not going to radically change politics'.²⁴ More recently, R. J. Maratea's *The Politics of the Internet: Political Claims-Making in Cyberspace and Its Effect on Modern Political Activism* (2013) also explores the politics of making claims in cyberspace. Maratea argues that 'the ability to publicize claims and have them disperse through cyberspace does not guarantee that they will connect with prospective supporters, because the Internet has increased audience fragmentation'.²⁵ Yet for Maratea it is clear that the increased state surveillance of the Internet has shown that those with power will use Internet technologies 'to expand social control and disseminate propaganda'.²⁶ What is important to recognize is that although the Internet may not have changed politics radically in the fifteen years that separate these two studies, it has radically changed the meaning and function of being citizens with the rise of both corporate and state surveillance.²⁷

It is also in those fifteen years that several studies have demonstrated that gradually, if not quite significantly, what it means to be a citizen on the Internet has changed. This includes studies that continue to monitor and assess the impact of the Internet on citizen politics, especially in the United States and United Kingdom, as illustrated in studies of online conduct, participation, and engagement.²⁸ Karen Mossberger, Caroline Tolbert, and Ramona McNeal, for example, demonstrate in *Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society, and Participation* (2008) how online participation in society has become a necessary element of democratic citizenship.²⁹ By defining 'digital citizens' as 'those who use the internet regularly and effectively—that is on a daily basis', they have shown how inclusion in prevailing forms of communication have affected the ability to participate as democratic citizens. Stephen Coleman and Jay Blumler in *The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice and Policy* (2009) have shown that the Internet has a huge potential to deepen democratic citizenship when invested by imaginative governments.³⁰ Phillip Howard, by contrast, has shown in *New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen* (2006) how information technologies are used in producing a managed digital citizen.³¹

These studies have also started to expand in scope beyond the United States and United Kingdom to include international developments.³² In part, this reflects the increased involvement in the politics of the Internet of social groups such as youth, women, and minorities whose actions increasingly cross national borders and legal orders and have opened up various meanings and functions of being citizens.³³ Mark Poster, for example, argues that these involvements are giving rise to new political movements in cyberspace whose political subjects are not citizens, understood as members of nation-states, but instead netizens.³⁴ By using the term 'digital citizenship' as a heuristic concept, Nick Couldry and his colleagues also illustrate how digital infrastructures understood as social relations and practices are contributing to the emergence of a civic culture as a condition of citizenship.³⁵ Yet, they argue, it is not quite clear what kinds of subjects are emerging from these digital citizenship practices.

We argue that despite this proliferation of the term 'citizen' the figure of the citizen is lost in digital studies by both its presence and absence. When it is present, the figure of the citizen appears as a recipient of rights, a figure that already exists, and whose conduct already pertains to

good civic behaviour such as participation. The citizen, it is observed, engages (or fails to), participates (or fails to), and receives (or fails to) rights and entitlements. The figure, then, is largely an already present figure or a problem figure. To put it differently, the figure of the citizen is a problem of government: how to engage, cajole, coerce, incite, invite, or broadly encourage it to inhabit forms of conduct that are already deemed to be appropriate to being a citizen. What is lost here is the figure of the citizen as an embodied subject of experience who acts through the Internet for making rights claims. We will further elaborate on this subject of making rights claims, but the figure of the citizen that we imagine is not merely a bearer or recipient of rights that already exist but one whose activism involves making claims to rights that may or may not exist.

The figure of the citizen is also lost in description of the experiences of subjects who act through the Internet. This absence is evinced by the fact that the figure of the citizen is rarely, if ever, used to describe the acts of crypto-anarchists, cyberactivists, cypherpunks, hackers, hacktivists, whistle-blowers, and other political figures of cyberspace. It sounds almost outrageous if not perverse to call the political heroes of cyberspace as citizen subjects since the figure of the citizen seems to betray their originality, rebelliousness, and vanguardism, if not their cosmopolitanism. Yet the irony here is that this is exactly the figure of the citizen we inherit as a figure who makes rights claims. It is that figure that has been betrayed and shorn of all its radicality in the contemporary politics of the Internet. Instead, and more recently, the figure of the citizen is being lost to the figure of the human as recent developments in corporate and state data snooping and spying have exacerbated. As Rikke Jørgensen has documented, increasingly, rights to privacy, access, and protection are solely articulated as human rights arguments.³⁶ There are, of course, exceptions to this, perhaps most famously Edward Snowden's pseudonym *Citizenfour* and scholars such as Timothy Luke and Mark Poster.³⁷ Nevertheless, the figure of the citizen is dimly visible and instead is either a problem subject of government or a problem subject of human rights.

The situation in citizenship studies is the opposite of digital studies. It is the figure of cyberspace that is practically lost in citizenship studies. We also observe cyberspace in relation to both its presence and absence. When the figure of cyberspace is present, it often refers to a nebulous space, often separate if not independent of physical space and one to which only some people belong. There is a certain mysticism that sur-

rounds the figure. Its absence is often evinced during major political events such as Occupy Wall Street, *los indignados* of 15M, or Arab uprisings by the difficulty of accounting for the role of digital media in them.³⁸ But the figure of cyberspace is also absent in citizenship studies as scholars have yet to find a way to conceive of the figure of the citizen beyond its modern configuration as a member of the nation-state. Consequently, when the acts of subjects traverse so many borders and involve a multiplicity of legal orders, identifying this political subject as a citizen becomes a fundamental challenge. So far, describing this traversing political subject as a global citizen or cosmopolitan citizen has proved difficult if not contentious.³⁹

To summarize, when we say that the figure of the citizen is lost in digital studies and that the figure of cyberspace is lost in citizenship studies, our aim is to bring attention to the question concerning political subjectivity in cyberspace. So rather than defining digital citizens narrowly as 'those who have the ability to read, write, comprehend, and navigate textual information online and who have access to affordable broadband' or 'active citizens online' or even 'Internet activists', we understand digital citizens as those who make digital rights claims, which we will elaborate in chapter 2.⁴⁰

So to understand what it means to be digital citizens requires theorizing between digital life (and its digital subjects) and political life (and its political subjects). Both are simultaneously undergoing transformation, and understanding the dynamics of these changes is a challenge. It is a challenge that critical citizenship studies amply illustrates by focusing on citizenship as a site of contestation or social struggle rather than bundles of given rights and duties.⁴¹ It is an approach that understands rights as not static or universal but historical and situated and arising from social struggles. The space of this struggle involves the politics of how we both shape and are shaped by sociotechnical arrangements of which we are a part. From this follows that subjects embody both the material and immaterial aspects of these arrangements where distinctions between the two become untenable.⁴² Who we become as political subjects—or subjects of any kind, for that matter—is neither given or determined but enacted by what we do in relation to others and things. If so, being digital and being citizens are simultaneously the objects and subjects of political struggle, and understanding the relations between these struggles is the aim of this book.

Towards developing an understanding of being digital citizens, we draw on a number of scholars who typically study the technical workings of digital devices and platforms and their social, cultural, and political effects. We have learned a lot from the burgeoning literature on the Internet.⁴³ Our goal is not to focus on the specificities of how technologies like Google or Twitter algorithms work. Although we do give many examples, our aim is to develop an empirically grounded but theoretical conception of the digital citizen as a political subject. We also recognize that our examples are predominantly from Anglo-American sources, which in part says a lot about the concentration of technologies, ownership, and the scandals of our digital lives. We mention these issues to especially foreground that our focus is on *theorizing* what we call digital acts and being digital citizens and that such theorizing is necessary to clear the ground for more detailed and penetrating investigations. It is an approach we share with others and especially with J. L. Austin's *How to Do Things with Words*, work that we take up in chapter 3 to develop our conception of digital acts drawing on his theory of speech acts.⁴⁴ Austin understands language as a means of social action. We take this up to interpret digital acts as a kind of speech act and means of social struggle. At present, studies of the Internet and empirical analyses of specific digital platforms are proliferating, yet we lack concepts for framing and interpreting what these mean for being digital citizens. Many of the conventional concepts with which we are familiar, such as online, offline, virtual, and real, for example, do not hold up to critical scrutiny but instead serve as placeholders in search of concepts. Yet having concepts is critical because they shape our perceptions and imaginaries, and it is through concepts that we make sense of our experiences. Our aim, then, is to provide a conceptual apparatus that might help us to think across the numerous studies and accounts so that when we consider Twitter, for instance, we can ask: How do conventions such as microblogging platforms configure actions and create possibilities for digital citizens to act?

BECOMING DIGITAL CITIZENS

We use the term 'critical' to indicate a tradition that is marked by critical reflexivity but also by an open, engaging, and political style of thought. More specifically, however, 'critical' designates a style of thought where we investigate the acts of those who rupture contemporary conventions

of being political and enact creative, autonomous, and inventive ways of becoming political. Through this approach, we have marked out what we consider to be several moves in how we theorize being digital citizens. We outline them here, recognizing that one can grasp their fuller meaning and function only by reading the chapters that follow.

In chapter 2, we develop an understanding of the space of digital life as the figure of *cyberspace* and an understanding of the figure of the *citizen* that we inherit. Rather than a separate or independent space constituted by the digital interactions and transactions of people, we define it as a space of relations between and among bodies acting through the Internet. We develop our approach to being digital citizens by drawing on Michel Foucault to argue that subjects become citizens through various processes of subjectivation that involve relations between bodies and things that constitute them as subjects of power. We focus on how people enact themselves as subjects of power through the Internet and at the same time bring cyberspace into being. We position this understanding of subjectivation against that of *interpellation*, which assumes that subjects are always and already formed and inhabited by external forces. Rather, we argue that citizen subjects are summoned and called upon to act through the Internet and, as subjects of power, respond by enacting themselves not only with obedience and submission but also subversion. If indeed we understand cyberspace as a space of relations *between and among bodies* acting through the Internet, ways of being digital citizens is a site of struggle between virtuous, malicious, righteous, and indifferent acts. Our performativity always involves relations between ourselves and others. In this way, conducting ourselves means to act *with* others as we place ourselves and take up and carve out social positions—something that Foucault captured by defining power as ‘action upon action’ or ‘conduct of conduct’.

Chapter 3 develops a conception of how we say and do things through the Internet by defining digital acts as a kind of speech act. We do this by taking up Austin’s definition of five classes of speech acts that have performative force: judgments, decisions, commitments, acknowledgements, and clarifications. To this we introduce a *sixth class of speech act*, which we think these classes do not account for: *claims*. We arrive at this through our consideration of the citizen subject who articulates ‘I, we, they have a right to’. While subjects perform all classes of speech acts and not only through the Internet, making rights claims are specific to

our definition of citizens as not sovereign rights-bearing but performative rights-claiming subjects. We argue that making rights claims involves not only performative but also legal and imaginary forces. We then argue that *digital acts* involve conventions that include not only words but also images and sounds and various actions such as liking, coding, clicking, downloading, sorting, blocking, and querying. If Austin showed *how we do things with words*, we also try to show *how we do words with things*.⁴⁵ We argue that these digital acts resignify four political questions about the Internet: anonymity, extensity, traceability, and velocity.

In chapters 4, 5, and 6 we then specify how these contestations are enacted through three groupings of digital acts—callings, openings, and closings—and outline the various conventions and actions that compose them. Chapter 7, rather than considering the substance of digital rights, attends to the processes involved in *enacting digital rights claims*. We do so by bringing together those political subjects who make digital rights claims by their acts through the Internet (performativity) and those who make digital rights claims in or by what they say about those rights in declarations, bills, charters, and manifestos (imaginary) and call upon authorities for the inscription of those rights (legality).

Collectively, these moves refine our approach to enacting digital citizens. We work through a complex terrain of openings and closings that cyberspace occasions but also raise a fundamental—and increasingly universal—question: How do we conduct ourselves through the Internet? Given the rights cyberspace occasions and we demand, should we embrace it without question? Given the perils it elicits, should we avoid it? Given the dangers it creates, should we abandon it? Given its potentialities, should we tout the dawn of a new era? All these questions are being asked today, yet they may not be the questions that really matter. Given its pervasiveness and omnipresence, avoiding or shunning cyberspace is as dystopian as quitting social space; it is also certain that conducting ourselves in cyberspace requires, as many activists and scholars have warned, intense critical vigilance. Since there cannot be generic or universal answers to how we conduct ourselves, more or less every incipient or existing political subject needs to ask in what ways it is being called upon and subjectified through cyberspace. In other words, to return again to the conceptual apparatus of this book, the kinds of citizen subjects cyberspace cultivates are not homogenous and universal but fragmented, multiple, and agonistic. At the same time, the figure of a citizen yet to

come is not inevitable; while cyberspace is a fragile and precarious space, it also affords openings, moments when thinking, speaking, and acting differently become possible by challenging and resignifying its conventions. These are the moments that we highlight to argue that digital rights are not only a project of inscriptions but also enactment.

NOTES

1. We recognize that digital life has preceded the Internet. The connectedness of digital lives is a more recent phenomenon associated with the Internet, especially the World Wide Web protocol. Our focus in this book is the political consequences and implications of digital lives being connected through the Internet rather than digital lives in general. See J. E. Cohen, *Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice* (Yale University Press, 2012); N. Negroponte, *Being Digital* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1995); Z. Papacharissi, ed., *A Networked Self: Identity, Community and Culture on Social Network Sites* (Routledge, 2011).

2. Negroponte, *Being Digital*; S. Turkle, *Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet* (Simon & Schuster, 1995).

3. E. Morozov, *The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate the World* (PublicAffairs, 2011); S. Turkle, *Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other* (Basic, 2011).

4. R. Deibert, "The Geopolitics of Internet Control: Censorship, Sovereignty, and Cyberspace," in *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*, ed. A. Chadwick and P. N. Howard (Routledge, 2009), 324.

5. M. Venkataramanan, "The Data Industry Is Selling Your Life," *Wired*, Nov. 2014; L. Harding, *The Snowden Files: The Inside Story of the World's Most Wanted Man* (Vintage, 2014). As we shall see below, what is also staggering is the emergence of a commercial and noncommercial security industry that advises data subjects that they are individually responsible for protecting their privacy and safety, thereby individualizing what is essentially a political and hence a collective problem.

6. A. Hern, "Sir Tim Berners-Lee Speaks out on Data Ownership." *Guardian* 2014 [accessed 8 October 2014], bit.ly/1t2DEPR.

7. O. Bowcott, "Bullied Man Uses Video from Sunglasses to Mount Private Court Case," *Guardian*, 7 October 2014 [accessed 12 October 2014], bit.ly/ZVoTBF.

8. J. Katz, "The Digital Citizen," *Wired* 5, 12, Dec. 1997, 5.

9. *Ibid.*, 7–8.

10. W. J. Miller, "Digital Citizen," in *Encyclopedia of Social Media and Politics*, ed. K. Harvey (Sage, 2014), 2.

11. Digital Citizens Alliance, "Become a Digital Citizen: Get Involved in Making the Internet Safe 2014" [accessed 26 September 2014], bit.ly/1utQ7vz.

12. S. White, *The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen* (Harvard University Press, 2009).

13. D. Bigo, "The Transnational Field of Computerised Exchange of Information in Police Matters and Its European Guilds," in *Transnational Power Elites: The Social and Global Structuration of the EU*, ed. N. Kauppi and M. R. Madsen (Routledge, 2013); D. Bigo, "Security, Surveillance and Democracy," in *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*, ed. K. Ball et al. (Routledge, 2012). For Bigo, the rights of data subjects depend

on their behaviour within digital networks. If their behaviour conflicts with targets identified by algorithms, their rights will come under question.

14. This is a question posed with respect to surveillance by Z. Bauman et al., "After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance," *International Political Sociology* 8, 2 (2014). The authors raise the question about how multiple actors would need to resist surveillance strategies but also the question of how Internet users will adjust their everyday conduct. It is an open question whether Internet users 'will continue to participate in their own surveillance through self-exposure or develop new forms of subjectivity that is more reflexive about the consequences of their own actions' (124).

15. *Ibid.*, 128. Using the Möbius strip as a metaphor to capture the transversal nature of the Internet, especially concerning surveillance, Bauman et al. argue that 'while big data collection blurs categorizations of what is "domestic" and what is "foreign," the consequent reconfiguration of the boundaries of the sovereign state into a Möbius strip has in turn become a site, in and of itself, of political struggles, resistance and dissent. Along the Möbius strip, states, social movements, and individuals can play a variety of games, reenacting the meanings of sovereignty and citizenship, security, and liberty.'

16. We must heed Didier Bigo's work, which documents how an international field of security professionals emerged and how its professionals are heavily invested in the hyperinflation of dangers and threats of cyberspace. Often, Bigo argues, interventions to quell such dangers serve to expand the security apparatus itself rather than enhancing security. See Bigo, "Security, Surveillance and Democracy," 278.

17. Some examples include T. W. Luke, "Digital Citizenship," in *Emerging Digital Spaces in Contemporary Society: Properties of Technology*, ed. P. Kalantzis-Cope and K. Gherab Martín (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); M. Poster, "Digital Networks and Citizenship," *Proceedings of Modern Language Association of America (PMLA)* 117, 1 (2002).

18. K. Mossberger et al., *Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society, and Participation* (MIT Press, 2008); K. Mossberger et al., "Measuring Digital Citizenship: Mobile Access and Broadband," *International Journal of Communication* 6 (2012).

19. E. Mayo and T. Steinberg, "The Power of Information: An Independent Review," June 2007 [accessed 12 October 2014], bit.ly/ZVoZct.

20. The field of digital studies not only comprises the impact of digital technologies but also their increasing connectedness. As such, digital studies includes but is broader than another incipient field, that of Internet studies. The broad scope of Internet studies includes not only the technologies that make the Internet possible but also uses of these technologies and the development of national and international policies to govern and regulate their functioning. C. Ess and M. Consalvo, "Introduction: What Is 'Internet Studies'?" in *The Handbook of Internet Studies*, ed. M. Consalvo and C. Ess (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); W. H. Dutton, "Internet Studies: The Foundations of a Transformative Field," in *The Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies*, ed. W. H. Dutton (Oxford University Press, 2013).

21. A. Kroker and M. Kroker, *Critical Digital Studies: A Reader*, 2nd ed. (University of Toronto Press, 2013).

22. *Ibid.*, 14.

23. K. A. Hill and J. E. Hughes, *Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

24. *Ibid.*, 180, 182.

25. R. J. Maratea, *The Politics of the Internet: Political Claims-Making in Cyberspace and Its Effect on Modern Political Activism* (Lexington, 2014), 117.

26. *Ibid.*, 126.
27. This is quite evident in a large collection of already established essays on the politics of the Internet. W. H. Dutton and E. Dubois, eds., *Politics and the Internet*, 4 vols. (Routledge, 2014).
28. S. Coleman, "The Lonely Citizen: Indirect Representation in an Age of Networks," *Political Communication* 22, 2 (2005); Mossberger et al., *Digital Citizenship*; P. N. Howard, *New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen* (Cambridge University Press, 2006); S. Coleman and J. G. Blumler, *The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice and Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
29. Mossberger et al., *Digital Citizenship*.
30. Coleman and Blumler, *The Internet and Democratic Citizenship*.
31. Howard, *New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen*.
32. J. C. Santora, "Crossing the Digital Divide: Do All Global Citizens Have Their Passports?," *Academy of Management Perspectives* 20, 4 (2006); J. James, "The Digital Divide across All Citizens of the World: A New Concept," *Social Indicators Research* 89, 2 (2008); G. Yang, *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online* (Columbia University Press, 2009); K. L. Schlozman et al., "Who Speaks? Citizen Political Voice on the Internet Commons," *Daedalus* 140, 4 (2011); K. Tartoussieh, "Virtual Citizenship: Islam, Culture, and Politics in the Digital Age," *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 17, 2 (2011); M. Gillespie, "BBC Arabic, Social Media and Citizen Production: An Experiment in Digital Democracy before the Arab Spring," *Theory, Culture & Society* 30, 4 (2013).
33. T. Kern and S.-h. Nam, "The Making of a Social Movement: Citizen Journalism in South Korea," *Current Sociology* 57, 5 (2009); W. Y. Lin et al., "Becoming Citizens: Youths' Civic Uses of New Media in Five Digital Cities in East Asia," *Journal of Adolescent Research* 25, 6 (2010); Tartoussieh, "Virtual Citizenship: Islam, Culture, and Politics in the Digital Age"; L. Herrera, "Youth and Citizenship in the Digital Age: A View from Egypt," *Harvard Educational Review* 82, 3 (2012); Y. M. Kim, "The Shifting Sands of Citizenship: Toward a Model of the Citizenry in Life Politics," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 644 (2012).
34. Poster, "Digital Networks and Citizenship," 101–3.
35. N. Couldry et al., "Digital Citizenship? Narrative Exchange and the Changing Terms of Civic Culture," *Citizenship Studies* 18, 6–7 (2014).
36. R. F. Jørgensen, *Framing the Net: The Internet and Human Rights* (Edward Elgar, 2013).
37. Poster, "Digital Networks and Citizenship"; M. Poster, "Cyberdemocracy: Internet and the Public Sphere," in *Politics and the Internet*, ed. W. H. Dutton and E. Dubois (Routledge, 2014); Luke, "Digital Citizenship."
38. Neither of the two major handbooks on citizenship studies surveying the entire field globally, for example, features a chapter on digital citizens or discusses broadly the impact of the Internet for citizenship studies. H.-A. Van der Heijden, ed., *Handbook of Political Citizenship and Social Movements* (Edward Elgar, 2014); E. F. Isin and P. Nyers, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies* (Routledge, 2014).
39. The debate over global or cosmopolitan citizenship is now extensive, but it has proved to be a contested concept. H. Schattle, *The Practices of Global Citizenship* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); D. Archibugi, *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Princeton University Press, 2008).
40. Mossberger et al., *Digital Citizenship*, 140.
41. J. Clarke et al., *Disputing Citizenship* (Policy Press, 2014).

42. K. Hayles, "The Materiality of Informatics," *Configurations* 1, 1 (1993).

43. Cohen, *Configuring the Networked Self*; E. G. Coleman, *Coding Freedom: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Hacking* (Princeton University Press, 2013); R. Deibert, *Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace* (McClelland & Stewart, 2013); C. Fuchs, *Social Media: A Critical Introduction* (Sage, 2014); P. Gerbaudo, *Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism* (Pluto, 2012); T. Jordan, *Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet* (Routledge, 1999); L. Lessig, *Code: Version 2.0* (Basic, 2006); Morozov, *Net Delusion*; Papacharissi, ed., *A Networked Self*; H. Postigo, *The Digital Rights Movement: The Role of Technology in Subverting Digital Copyright* (MIT Press, 2012); J. van Dijck, *The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media* (Oxford University Press, 2013).

44. J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford University Press, 1962).

45. This is inspired by Bruno Latour's reversal of Austin's statement—doing things with words—to 'doing words with things'. Though he does not refer to Austin when he uses this phrase in this chapter, we think his approach very much follows Austin's conceptualization of speech acts. B. Latour, "The Berlin Key or How to Do Words with Things," in *Matter, Materiality and Modern Culture*, ed. P. Graves-Brown (Routledge, 2000). However, in another writing, Latour references Austin's *How to do Things with Words* in his analysis of how legal texts are made up of not declarative but performative statements. There he argues that a weakness of Austin's concept of speech acts is his reliance on grammar and short interactions rather than 'the whole regime of enunciation.' B. Latour, *An Ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat* (Polity, 2010), 225.

