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CHAPTER FOUR

Enacting Citizenship

Chapters 2 and 3 have considered two grand narratives that shape modern political subjectivities. These two are not the only, let alone dominant, narratives. But what makes them 'grand' is their ubiquitous character. Through various rituals, practices, routines, protocols, institutions, declarations, proclamations and statements, each narrative has become the form through which subjects come into being through invitations, interpellations, enforcement, law, norms, rules and regulations that make up heterogeneous and complex fields of political identification.¹ Through citations, repetitions and iterations of those elements that constitute these narratives as fields, subjectivities are performatively taken up. It is often recognized that sovereignty understood as 'we, the people' has performed such a function; it is much less so in the case of connectivity as 'we, the connected'. As we have seen, each narrative has a significant bearing on citizenship understood as political subjectivity.

But what does 'citizenship as political subjectivity' mean? The phrase appeared early in this book and it never quite disappeared or lost its evocative force. Yet, so far I have not explained it either. We focused on the idea of subjectivation in Chapter 3 and political subjectivation would probably have been a better term for continuing our discussion in Chapter 4. But here and now we will depart from a problem that exercised Foucault, Deleuze and Bourdieu. The insistence on the immanent character of the fold (Deleuze), habitus (Bourdieu) or subjectivation (Foucault) leads to an emphasis on how subjects come into being as ethical or moral subjects. But I am interested in political subjectivity as creative, inventive and autonomous ways of becoming political through relating to oneself and others. It may sound surprising but Deleuze, Foucault or Bourdieu were rarely, if at all, interested in political subjectivity as a performative force that breaks habits or ways of doing things and throws the subject into uncertainty, indeterminacy and the unknown. On two occasions that I quoted in Chapter 1,

Foucault reflected on the subject that acts but otherwise he focused on technologies of power and technologies of the self and the relation between the two, which he called governmentality. We will see below during a discussion of Austin that Bourdieu also focused on the subject who conducts himself or herself rather than the subject who acts. I used the phrase ‘creative, inventive and autonomous’ in Chapter 1, but it is in this chapter that I will develop it. Still, I shall argue, what makes subjectivity political is not only that it is creative, inventive and autonomous but that it also articulates an injustice and demands or claims its redress. It is this demand or claim that gives birth to political subjectivity and its expression to rights. This is what the concept ‘enacting citizenship’ signifies. It places emphasis on the transformation of practices that lead to the emergence of creative, inventive and autonomous acts of becoming political subjects. Unless we develop a dynamic understanding of citizenship that is performative, it would be impossible to develop the idea of citizens without frontiers as those whose acts traverse frontiers and interrogate and transgress both sovereignty and connectivity narratives.

Citizenship as political subjectivity

Let us start with citizenship and then return to political subjectivity. I find it useful to describe citizenship as the right to claim rights.² This phrase highlights the idea that before there are any rights, there is the right to be political and that the right to be political can only exist by exercising it. This may sound like a circular argument but the idea here is that the existence of rights presupposes political subjectivity and rights are effective only in practice. Without practising that right (to have or claim rights), we cannot even claim to be human. If we think that we have rights by virtue of being human, then this phrase reminds us that we have gained the right to say so only because we have struggled *for it* as political subjects. To put it in another way, and perhaps counter-intuitive way, we become political subjects before we become bearers of human rights. Without struggling as political subjects, we cannot have dignity, justice, peace, freedom, speech let alone economic, social, cultural or sexual rights. The source of the right to claim rights is more dynamic than if we assume it is God, humanity or the state. It is social and political struggles that connect and combine demands and claims and articulate them through available sources (legal, illegal, social, cultural, religious or other).³

There are basically three ways that we can approach citizenship: status, habitus and acts. If we were to approach citizenship as status, our concern would be things such as rules, regulations and laws that govern who can and cannot be a citizen in a given state. We would want to know who qualifies

for citizenship and the laws of acquisition and deprivation of citizenship. We would learn about things such as *jus sanguinis* (whereby a child inherits citizenship via a parent), *jus soli* (whereby a child inherits citizenship via birth regardless of parentage) or *jus domicili* (whereby an adult acquires citizenship by naturalization in a state other than that of his birth). These three principles (*jus sanguinis*, *jus soli* and *jus domicili*) attach statuses to individual or collective bodies. Migration (and immigration) scholars, especially in law but also in sociology and politics, focus on citizenship as status because it affects who can or cannot hold rights in a given state.⁴ Approaching citizenship as status also includes consideration of the legal rights and responsibilities of citizens in a given state. This is probably the most dominant way of approaching citizenship. National and comparative rights in modern states itself is a rapidly changing field as these rights and responsibilities in turn change rapidly.⁵ We would be interested in knowing what social rights (e.g. welfare benefits, housing subsidies, unemployment insurance) and civil liberties such as privacy, due process in courts and rights to assembly pertain in a given state.

If we were to approach citizenship as habitus, we would be interested in how citizens and perhaps non-citizens practice the rights that they do have.⁶ Just because citizens have the right to vote, participate, claim benefits, move and so on, this should not imply that they practice these rights and we would be interested to know why they do and why they do not. Quite understandably, sociologists and anthropologists have most contributed to this approach to citizenship through studies of citizenship practices.⁷ Rather than attaching statuses to bodies, approaching citizenship as habitus asks how those bodies come into being and how those statuses get attached to them. That is why they have also been interested in things such as multicultural, sexual, global and environmental forms of citizenship as these indicate different and perhaps sometimes novel ways of practising citizenship.⁸

If we were to approach citizenship as acts, we would be interested in how people constitute themselves as political subjects by the things they do, their deeds. Just notice already the change in approach. It is not so much that we are interested in people but in how the various things that they do – deeds – actually make them who they are or, rather, how they make themselves through the things they do. But, we may ask, this sounds a lot like approaching citizenship as practices just as sociologists and anthropologists have done. Not quite. If we approach citizenship as acts, we would be interested not only what people do but also how the things they do break away from norms, expectations, routines, rituals, in short, their habitus. This is because if we approach citizenship as status and practices, we focus on already constituted orders, as it were, under which those with status practise their citizenship or those without are denied from practising. By contrast, if we approach citizenship as acts, we are interested in how those

whose status is not citizenship may act as if they are and claim rights that they may not have. This brings an element of disruption or rupture into the order and may call for the subject to break his or her habitus. If we recall our discussion of Rancière and Laclau, then approaching citizenship as acts clearly shares strong affinities with their approach to political subjectivity. I raised issues with their commitment to people as a whole and admitted that ‘politics without people’ does indeed sound strange if not dangerous. Yet, pursuing citizenship as political subjectivity requires maintaining this critical distance from the need to identify people as the foundation of political identification for the reasons that I encapsulated in the term ‘the sovereign beast’ that makes itself present in both narratives of ‘we, the people’ and ‘we, the connected’. This chapter then is not only about citizenship as political subjectivity but also how we might conceive it without the category ‘people’. And ultimately it is this possibility that lies at the heart of the concept of ‘citizens without frontiers’.

Disobedience as enacting citizenship

It is 19 December 2008. An auction is being held by the US Government’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) of drilling rights for oil and gas development on parcels of national park land primarily in the western states, including wilderness areas in Utah national parks. There are protests outside the federal building in Salt Lake City where the auction is taking place. Among the protesters is Tim DeChristopher, a 27-year-old activist and an economics student at the University of Utah. He decides to enter the federal building rather than protest outside. Asked later about his ‘intention’, he recounts: ‘I went into the auction with the idea of creating a little disruption, maybe making a speech and getting myself arrested.’⁹ This so far sounds like he was ‘intending’ to stage a direct action used widely by activists. When he enters the building, remarkably, the person at the desk asks ‘Are you here to bid?’ It is a question. But is also an interpellation, that is, an invitation to occupy or inhabit a position, a subject position. Apparently in a spontaneous and unpremeditated manner, he says yes. He receives an auction sign marked Bidder 70. By the time a federal official finally stops him, Bidder 70 will have made successful bids for more than 22,000 acres of land worth \$1.8 million. The question arises: Was he a genuine or authentic bidder?

The court decides he was not. But DeChristopher disagrees and asks: What does a genuine bidder mean? This is a good question but the court does not answer it. Instead, it sentences him to 2 years in prison and fines him \$10,000 for disrupting a federal auction.¹⁰ Although the sentence could have been harsher for an ‘act of civil disobedience’, it was still a significant

punishment given that in his statement DeChristopher asked the judge to consider various possibilities of community service as punishment. It was widely believed that ‘The U.S. Attorney’s office went after DeChristopher because they wanted to make an example out of him, to show other activists what happens when you mess with the system.’¹¹ Calling this a ‘Rosa Parks’ moment for environmental activism, it is suggested that DeChristopher’s act revealed how the US legal system favoured corporate interests.

This act illustrates almost all of the qualities (perhaps save one) of what enacting citizenship involves despite the insistence of both the activist himself and other interpreters to call it an ‘act of civil disobedience’ rather than an ‘act of citizenship’. One quality that it does not perhaps feature is the traversing of frontiers in any obvious way but we will see if that is the case in due course. Throughout this chapter, we will discuss in more detail elements that constitute enacting citizenship and will return to this act, among others, to illustrate conceptual issues. We will also discuss why it is important to call it an act of citizenship and insist on keeping disobedience within the idea of citizenship rather than considering it an exception. But we will make two observations on this act before we start our discussion on enacting citizenship and its relation to the concept ‘citizens without frontiers’.

To return to the issue of civil disobedience, quoting the prosecutor’s claim that ‘The rule of law is the bedrock of our civilized society, not acts of “civil disobedience” committed in the name of the cause of the day,’ DeChristopher argues instead that the birth of the United States of America and the rule of law were creations of acts of civil disobedience.¹² Moreover, ‘DeChristopher’s defence was complicated from the start when the judge refused to hear arguments that he had been compelled to act, to prevent a greater evil.’¹³ Here is an intended direct action that turns into a purposive but non-intentional and creative act. DeChristopher is ‘compelled’ to act against his responsibilities to observe and obey the rules of the auction and instead to act answerably for his understanding of the common good. After all, he thinks, ‘the rule of law is dependent upon a government that is willing to abide by the law. Disrespect for the rule of law begins when the government believes itself and its corporate sponsors to be above the law.’¹⁴

This act reveals the complex qualities that constitute an act: paradoxes of legality and illegality, responsibility and answerability, intentionality and purposiveness, acts and actions, and rupture and change. We are interested in it because it is creative (deliberate yet spontaneous, mischievous yet serious, courageous yet not heroic), inventive (surprising yet predictable, illegal yet acceptable, outrageous yet reasonable) and autonomous (individual yet collective, scripted yet experimental, unauthorized yet meaningful). It also shows why it is important to insist on calling it an act of citizenship and introduce that phrase into our political vocabulary and analytics. That,

at least, is the argument we will pursue. I mentioned above that we will depart from the insistence on the immanent character of the fold (Deleuze), habitus (Bourdieu) or subjectivation (Foucault) to describe our relations with ourselves and others. What I propose in the following is to first focus on Hannah Arendt's theory of action as it is relevant both to consider civil disobedience and to interpret action as beginning something new rather than repeating or reiterating behaviour or practice. Then I will broaden the discussion from Arendt to theories of performativity and enactment before I return to the question of citizenship as political subjectivity.

Beginning something new

Arendt starts from the position that action – as distinguished from not only contemplation but also work and labour – enables human beings to perform their agency, which involves bringing something new into the world whose outcomes are unpredictable. For her, if humans were reproducible repetitions of the same whose essence was predictable, we would not need the concept of action.¹⁵ Unlike Deleuze, Foucault or Bourdieu then Arendt differentiates action from conduct and makes action the beginning of something new as her sustained focus. Unfortunately, Arendt relates this capacity to begin something new to natality. For Arendt, each human shares the condition of natality, which gives us the capacity to initiate something new because each human being is born with the inherent capacity to come into the world as new.¹⁶ I am unconvinced about the usefulness of associating this capacity with natality rather than seeing it as a capacity that we historically develop. At any rate, what is significant here is that both speech and action, or more accurately, speech as action reveals this capacity and discloses each human being in the presence of and in relation to others.¹⁷ I like the idea of action as the disclosure of ourselves that we neither anticipate nor determine. Arendt reserves the term 'action' for the actualization of this capacity. To act then means to take initiative, to begin and to set something new into motion. Because humans are newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, they are always prompted into action, into disclosing themselves to others. Arendt calls this capacity, or what it enables human beings to initiate, a 'miracle'. However, that newcomers bring something new into being is a miracle not because it is mystical but because it is unexpected and unpredicted. As Arendt puts it, 'not because we superstitiously believe in miracles, but because human beings, whether or not they know it, as long as they can act, are capable of achieving, and constantly do achieve, the improbable and unpredictable'.¹⁸ Each human is capable of performing the unexpected and it is only through this performance that each human being is able to disclose himself or herself as human.

The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this again is possible only because each man is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world.¹⁹

What an action reveals or discloses is not a being that already exists but a being that becomes through this disclosure or revelation. From this brief description, we may conclude that Arendt holds a subjectivist view of the agent but that is wrong. That she starts with this capacity does not mean that it expresses a sovereign subject capable of commanding a will and controlling the outcomes of its actions. We shall see shortly how Arendt addresses this but now let us take a step back and consider why it is important to hold a view of the agent that places emphasis on this capacity to bring something new into the world.

Theorizing action became so fundamental to Arendt that it pretty much preoccupied her throughout the 1950s and 1960s, after the publication of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). In fact, it makes its first appearance at the very end of that book with a section on ideology and terror as key aspects of totalitarianism as a novel form of government. Arguably, we can trace the origins of Arendt's theorizing of action to the end of *Totalitarianism*. There, having traced the conditions that led to the rise of totalitarian regimes, she concludes that totalitarianism is a distinct form of government and should not be equated with despotism, tyranny or dictatorship. What is both important and poignant here is that she ends her genealogical investigations with reflections on isolation, solitude and loneliness. Now, it may appear odd to end a treatise on the origins of totalitarianism with existential themes of solitude and loneliness but this is precisely her point: that totalitarianism both produced and was made possible by a figure of a human being who could not act, or rather whose capacity to act was negated. Totalitarian authorities were dependent upon developing a coercive logic by which individuals became isolated and were unable to act together. What totalitarianism achieved, if that is the word, was to make people invest in its logic by withdrawing from what Arendt already calls 'the great capacity of men to start something new'.²⁰ Totalitarianism disciplines individuals to invest in its logic, thus convincing them to surrender their freedom rather than invest in their capacity to begin something new. Arendt says 'freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to begin, just as freedom as a political reality is identical with a space of movement between men'.²¹ Since power always comes from human beings acting together, Arendt says isolated human beings become powerless. Totalitarianism renders this capacity to act into isolation. When human beings are isolated, they are caught in a situation where they cannot act because nobody will act with them.²² Arendt insists that isolation and loneliness are not the same. One can be lonely but can still be in the

company of others and in fact can act with others. By contrast, isolation is an ‘. . . impasse into which men are driven when the political sphere of their lives, where they act together in the pursuit of common concern, is destroyed.’²³ But Arendt argues that although totalitarianism exacerbated loneliness and isolation, these were already present realities since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and are arguably also present in liberalism of the twentieth century, and, we can add, in neo-liberalism of the twenty-first century. If totalitarianism isolates individuals by coercing them to surrender their capacity to act, liberalism interpellates them to surrender it by individualism. Thus ends *Origins of Totalitarianism*: ‘beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of man; politically, it is identical with man’s freedom.’²⁴ Moreover, ‘this beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man.’²⁵

Arendt expands this notion of beginning as disclosure in *The Human Condition* (1958). The disclosure of a human being happens through words and deeds. For Arendt

Without the accompaniment of speech, at any rate, action would not only lose its revelatory character, but, and by the same token, it would lose its subject, as it were; not acting men but performing robots would achieve what, humanly speaking, would remain incomprehensible.²⁶

Similarly, ‘Speechless action would no longer be action because there would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words.’²⁷ As I just mentioned above, for Arendt, the doer of deeds is not a sovereign subject with intentions and motives. She rejects the automaton conception of the agent who comes under the sway of either inner motives (subjectivism) or outer causes (objectivism).²⁸ She accepts that

although everybody started his life by inserting himself into the human world through action and speech, nobody is the author or producer of his own life story. In other words, the stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is not an author or producer.²⁹

To be blunt, Arendt admits, nobody knows whom she reveals when she discloses herself in deeds and words. This is why accounts given by actors in statements about their intentions, aims and motives can rarely, if ever, be useful material for interpreting the significance and truthfulness of their acts.³⁰ Since actions are inherently unpredictable and since actors are not reliable sources of interpretation, the full meaning of an act can be seen only when the fleeting moment of the deed is past.³¹ The full meaning of an act can only be produced when it has ended. We can already see many of the themes that dominate the way I use the term ‘act’ to define forms,

repertoires, or descriptions of social action. However, Arendt does not distinguish between ‘acts’ and ‘action’ and is ambiguous about the difference between ethical and political acts (and action). I will return to both of these issues later but for now we will see how she describes specifically political action.

For Arendt, all action seems political since it is through action that we disclose ourselves to the world. The political arises from acting together since we always disclose ourselves in the presence of others. We share our words and deeds.³² Actions create publics as spaces of appearance as we appear through them by disclosing ourselves in actions. But if we can only understand the full meaning of actions only when the deeds end, what guarantees their endurance? Arendt only answers this question insofar as she recognizes the need for their endurance and states that deeds have enormous capacity for endurance.³³ She identifies two things that guarantee the endurance of action by making it possible for humans to act. These two faculties are forgiving and promising.³⁴ Forgiveness ensures that humans are able to take risks in the face of the unpredictability of their actions by trusting those in whose presence they disclose themselves and in whose trust they place their disclosure. This requires courage *and* trust.³⁵ It is this trust in the forgiveness of others that enables humans to introduce themselves to the world. Thus, forgiveness itself is an act that ‘. . . does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven’.³⁶ Similarly, what protects us when taking risks is that we make and keep promises. This capacity guards us against the unpredictability and uncertainty of our actions.³⁷ Arendt emphatically states that forgiveness and promising enable the building of trust that is much stronger than any contract or treaty as the foundation of a body politic. The sovereignty of such a body politic, unlike that of ‘we, the people’, is not based on an identical will that inspires all its members but an agreed purpose for which the promises are binding.³⁸ The point for Arendt is that the disclosure of ourselves through unpredictable and uncertain actions becomes our way of exercising freedom not as a choice or sovereign will but as a capacity to call something new into being whose outcome is unpredictable.³⁹ Arendt differentiates ‘. . . a freedom of choice that arbitrates and decides between two given things, one good and one evil, and whose choice is predetermined by motive which has only to be argued to start its operation . . .’ from ‘. . . the freedom to call something into being which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known’.⁴⁰ Thus, for Arendt, ‘men *are* free as distinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to *be* free and to act are the same’.⁴¹ For this reason, ‘every act, seen from the perspective not of the agent but of the

process in whose framework it occurs and whose automatism it interrupts, is a “miracle” that is, something which could not be expected”.⁴² This is why Arendt actually does not speak much about the freedom of the actor but of the action itself. She says

action, to be free, must be free from motive on one side, from its intended goal as a predictable effect on the other. This is not to say that motives and aims are not important factors in every single act, but they are its determining factors, and action is free to the extent that it is able to transcend them.⁴³

The important point about actions is that their goals, ends and meanings

‘. . . have so little in common that in the course of one and the same action they can end up at such loggerheads that the actors stumble into the gravest conflicts and the historians who follow after, whose task it is to accurately relate what in fact happened, can find themselves in endless debates over interpretation.’⁴⁴

This is not a regrettable aspect of action for it is an inevitable aspect of political affairs.

If we were to sketch an outline of Arendt’s theorizing of action, then we would probably begin with three elements: that the end that an action pursues cannot follow from the means it employs (actions exceed end–means calculability); that its goals cannot be attributed to either internal motives (subjectivism) or external causes (objectivism) and, that the meaning of an action is always contained within itself and when an action ceases, that meaning ceases with the action itself. Arendt says that

in addition to these three elements of every political action – the end that it pursues, the goal which it has in mind and by which it orients itself, and the meaning that reveals itself in the course of the action – there is a fourth element, which, although it is never the direct cause of action, is nevertheless what first sets it into motion.⁴⁵

Arendt calls this fourth element the principle of action and describes it in ‘psychological terms’ as ‘the fundamental conviction that a group of people share’.⁴⁶ For Arendt, action ultimately springs from its principles. These principles do not operate from within but inspire from without. They are too broad to have specific actions with goals anchored to them, although specific aims can be judged against them. ‘For, unlike the judgment of the intellect which precedes action, and unlike the command of the will which initiates it, the inspiring principle becomes fully manifest only in the performing act itself . . .’⁴⁷ Unlike goals, motives and aims,

. . . the principle of an action can be repeated time and again, it is inexhaustible, and in distinction from its motive, the validity of a principle is universal, it is not bound to any particular person or to any particular group.⁴⁸

Yet, principles become manifest only through action and ‘. . . they are manifest in the world as long as the action lasts, but no longer’.⁴⁹

Arendt develops further the idea that the spirit of the laws is the principle of action in an essay on civil disobedience. Her core argument arises from a distinction that she borrows from Montesquieu and maintains throughout her writings on authority, freedom, action and revolution: that there is a difference between the spirit of the laws and their letter. She says “The spirit of the laws,” as Montesquieu understood it, is the principle by which people living under a particular system act and inspired to act.⁵⁰ When the letter and the spirit of the law come into conflict, the law must give way since the spirit of the law is an expression of negotiation and struggle over a long period of time and provide, as Arendt says, principles that inspire people to act. The right to dissent arises from upholding this distinction. Thus, civil disobedience is compatible with the *spirit* of American laws though it has proved difficult to recognize it.⁵¹ For this reason, Arendt differentiates conscientious objection from civil disobedience since the latter is political whereas the former is ethical.⁵²

Again, we can recognize the affinities between how we differentiate responsibility and answerability and how Arendt sees a difference between the spirit and letter of the law. I already mentioned that Arendt does not distinguish acts and action. Nor does she clearly distinguish ethical and political acts. Moreover, her emphasis on natality, the ‘supreme’ capacity to bring something new into the world whose outcomes are unpredictable, despite her efforts, appears too essentialist or at least mystical. I would rather see the capacity to dissent and rupture a given order of things as a historical capacity. It is historical rather than ‘inherent’ in the sense that humans have developed this capacity as a result of thousands of years of struggles, negotiations, enactments, performances and institutions. So rather than depending on natality and assuming that this capacity comes with newcomers to the world as a result of their birth, I see it as a historically developed capacity that is worth identifying, maintaining and enhancing. Why? The answer has to do with another term that I use to distinguish ethical or social acts from those that are political. It is justice. Following Derrida, I understand justice very much like Arendt understands the spirit of the law: principles by which people living under a particular system act and are inspired to act as opposed to laws which they must obey. As Derrida states

. . . justice is not the law. Justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve the law, that is, to deconstruct

the law. Without a call for justice we would not have any interest in deconstructing the law.⁵³

Going back to Arendt, her overlooking of the difference between acts and action led her to believe that the meaning of action lasted as long as the action itself. We must distinguish between acts as relatively lasting forms, repertoires or descriptions and the relatively short-lived actions that actualize these acts. That is why we can speak about such things as ‘acts of forgiveness’ or ‘acts of violence’ because we have developed common understandings of them over long periods of time by acting under those forms or descriptions.

To register these disagreements with Arendt does not mean to reject her theorizing of action. But it does mean to note its shortcomings and seek ways of overcoming them because her insistence on our capacity to act is too important to forget. Given that Arendt provides a powerful and effective theorizing of action, especially with her emphasis on speech and action, or rather, speech as action, it is surprising that she played a relatively minor, if any, role in the development of performativity and speech acts over the last several decades. It is all the more perplexing as her theory of action draws upon, elaborates and stretches reflections on human capacity to act found in Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger whose works inspire subsequent political thought in the twentieth century.⁵⁴

Subjectivity, performativity, enactment

Thinking about citizenship as performance or enactment enjoins, follows and departs from recent developments in social and political thought towards understanding subjectivity as a performative process.⁵⁵ These developments do not have singular but multiple origins and trajectories. As I mentioned, Arendt’s theorizing of action is mostly absent from these developments but it figures rather prominently in the way in which I will discuss them.

Genealogies of performativity and enactment

To begin with, it has to be acknowledged that performativity and enactment have had conterminous and entwined developments in diverse fields such as philosophy (in phenomenology with Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida and in linguistics with J. L. Austin, John Searle, Stanley Cavell), psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Alain Badiou), sociology and anthropology (Ervin Goffman, Victor Turner), history (Charles Tilly), literature (Mikhail Bakhtin) and drama

(Richard Schechner). It was Reinach who took up 'mental acts' from Husserl and developed the idea of 'social acts' and it was Heidegger who embraced it. Similarly, it was Austin who articulated the importance of performative utterances as acts in the sense of doing things with words. It was Searle who took up Austin and developed intentionality as the essence of speech acts. It was Lacan who first built upon Freud to identify the psychic aspects of acting and it was Badiou who took up Lacan's idea of the act. Goffman studied interaction rituals and performance of the self and it was Turner who drew upon theatre studies to deepen such interaction rituals. Tilly was especially interested in demonstrations and protests within social movements and how they developed repertoires of contentious acts. Bakhtin was concerned with both dramaturgical and speech acts and investigated the significance of acts as genres of speech and writing. Schechner too was focused on the dramaturgical aspects of performance and the formation of subjectivity.⁵⁶

It is probably fair to say that despite their differences in origin and aims, these diverse theorists were all concerned with understanding how we become subjects in a way that rejects both objectivist and subjectivist accounts of social action. How do we give an account of ourselves as capable of creative (deliberate yet spontaneous, mischievous yet serious, courageous yet not heroic), inventive (surprising yet predictable, illegal yet acceptable, outrageous yet reasonable) and autonomous (individual yet collective, scripted yet experimental, unauthorized yet meaningful) acts? Or, thinking with Arendt, how do we give an account of our capacity to bring something new into the world whose outcomes are unpredictable? Arguably, it is this question that drew more recent theorists such as Shoshana Felman, Judith Butler, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Annemarie Mol to various strands of performativity and enactment. Arguably too, this was the question that exercised Deleuze, Foucault and Bourdieu albeit with a focus on conduct rather than action.

All of this is to give you a sense of the complex genealogies of performativity and enactment in theory.⁵⁷ Although performance and performativity as concepts may have related origins, performativity has a specific genealogy that begins with John Austin's influential, if ambiguous, *How to Do Things with Words* (1962).⁵⁸ This beginning has been both positive and negative in the sense that although his focus on acts as objects of investigation proved innovative and creative, the specific focus on speech as linguistic expression distracted from investigating speech acts as assemblages of bodies and events.⁵⁹ As much as thinking about citizenship as enactment enjoins and follows performativity, therefore, there are differences between performativity and enactment.⁶⁰ These will become clear as we proceed but it would be useful here to provide a brief consideration of those aspects of Austin's work that bequeathed legacies for later appropriation.

The fascinating thing about Austin is that every distinction he introduced remained unstable and ambiguous and yet continued to stir imaginations and discussions. Take, for example, his key distinction between constative and performative utterances. While he thought that constative utterances describe (or at least attempt to describe) a state of affairs, performative utterances produce the state of affairs. Although nobody finds this distinction actually tenable (ironically, beginning with Austin himself), it continues to stir analytic discussion. As an utterance itself perhaps it embodies an ambiguity about whether it merely describes a state of affairs or brings about or performs it. But what is at stake with this distinction, and why did it prove so contentious and hence fruitful? Perhaps, it states what is obvious for us: that a statement gathers meaning only through the effects of what it produces.

This applies equally to the distinctions Austin introduced later. The differences between locutionary acts that involve saying something, illocutionary acts that involve urging something and perlocutionary acts that involve bringing about further and separate actions. Similarly, the distinctions between originary and secondary acts, between felicitous and infelicitous acts, between conventional and unconventional acts and between serious and non-serious acts were regularly expressed. Again, Austin himself found these distinctions 'troubling'.⁶¹ Still, the most creative aspects of doing things with words, as Austin envisaged (performed?), is the performative force of speech as acts. If we broaden the concept of speech from utterance to expressions (through gestures, gatherings, assemblies, placements) and movements that also involve multiple bodies, then we have the makings of quite distinct objects of investigation – acts.

Clearly, there were early takers, Bourdieu among them. As one can imagine, Bourdieu's main criticism was precisely Austin's exclusive focus on linguistic utterances as speech acts. Bourdieu argues that social acts can succeed only when someone or something endowed with a specific status or property is backed by a group or institution. Acts as diverse as marriage or circumcision or conferment or attribution would never acquire their performative force without social conditions that make such acts recognizable and legitimate. This is the case even when an act is accomplished by a sole agent who still acts within recognized forms and according to certain conventions. Following Austin, those who interpret such acts as though the words used in them possess the performative force to accomplish them fail to appreciate that they are fundamentally social acts in the sense of being instituted and instituting social rituals. There is no illocutionary force without the words themselves. For Bourdieu, social acts are rites of institution and draw their force, illocutionary force if you like, not from linguistic forms that govern them but from social conditions that make them possible. What renders an actor capable of accomplishing an act is precisely the collective belief that guarantees its institution.⁶² For Bourdieu, this is

not to deny the power of words. But such power is nothing other than the delegated power of the speaker as a social subject.⁶³

The illocutionary force of words cannot be found within those words themselves. The authority that gives words their performative force comes from outside of those words themselves. For Bourdieu, what language does is to represent this authority, manifest and symbolize it. Furthermore, the use of language depends on the social position of the speaker that governs the rules of legitimate speech.⁶⁴ What makes a speech legitimate is the symbolic power accumulated by the social group or institution that delegates the speaker. That is why the success of a performative utterance depends on the appropriateness of the speaker or his social function as a delegate. A performative utterance would fail if the speaker lacks such capacity or delegation to invest words with the power of his social function. In that sense, all speech acts are social acts and all social acts are acts of authority.⁶⁵ For a speech act to accomplish its performative force, it does not need to be understood at all; it only needs to be recognized.⁶⁶ For such a recognition to register, the speaker must show that he does not act in his own name and on his own authority but in his capacity as a delegate.⁶⁷

Although Bourdieu's intervention is powerful here in highlighting the fact that performative force is not inherent in words, he does not acknowledge that the success of a performative utterance can also depend on the *inappropriateness* of the speaker or his *lack* of social function as a delegate. Perhaps here the difference between focusing on conduct and on action becomes most clear. Bourdieu's concern is to give an account of the conduct of agents. But a subject who acts is often, if not always, in breach of the conventions that govern conduct. What theorizing acts concerns is giving an account or at least developing a vocabulary or analytics for understanding acts when subjects *fail* to follow conventions. Bourdieu's reminder that the illocutionary force of words cannot be found within those words themselves is important. However, his insistence that the authority that gives words their performative force comes from outside of those words themselves is not very useful principally because it seeks to identify the conditions of the possibility of conduct. Instead, we want to understand the conditions of the *impossibility* of conducting oneself properly. This leads to another related but distinct issue about originary versus mimetic acts.

The most significant aspect of discussion on performativity concerns whether the essence of a speech act is originary or citational or iterative. The issue here is to determine whether an act merely repeats an already existing repertoire albeit under different conditions or brings something 'creative, inventive and autonomous' into the world (or as Arendt would say brings something new into the world with surprising effects). If the

former is the case, then what is the point of calling something an act rather than a performance or practice? What is at stake here is more than speech as language. It concerns one of the most vexing matters in social and political thought: as subjects to what extent do we act creatively, inventively and autonomously rather than imitatively, routinely and dependently. If you are a student, what is the promise of enacting yourself as a creative, inventive and autonomous subject by doing exactly what millions of students have always done before? What are you bringing that is new to the world? If you are a mother, what is the possibility of being a creative and inventive caregiver who cultivates autonomy in a child, if billions of mothers have gone through it all before? What are you bringing that is new to the world? If we become subjects by taking up scripts, routines and conventions in life as given, inhabiting ways of being that have been scripted for us then what is the promise of being creative, inventive and autonomous? What are we bringing that is new to the world? These are essentially the questions that Auden's poem 'Unknown Citizen' provokes. By going through various scripts that a citizen is supposed to follow from the point of view of authorities, Auden then asks whether this unknown citizen is free, or Arendt would say whether she practises her capacity to act. Then with a twist of irony, Auden says the question is absurd. This is because if the citizen acted, or she brought something new to the world, we would have heard. What Auden provokes is exactly the question we should be asking about the political subjectivity of the citizen.⁶⁸ Why creativity, inventiveness and autonomy? Why insist on our capacity to bring something new to the world with a surprising outcome? For *political* subjectivity, it is essential to have these attributes for without them we cannot imagine subjects capable of enacting themselves as equal, critical and activist subjects who will discriminate between justice and injustice, between equal and unequal and between fair and unfair. Admittedly, if we understand citizenship as political subjectivity, it is because we already hold an idea of subjectivity involving creativity, inventiveness and autonomy. If that subject we call a citizen always acts within given scripts, how do we account for the change in our understanding of rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and traversing frontiers?

This discussion leads me to outline five theoretical propositions as guidelines for investigating acts: (1) ruptures are not citations, repetitions or iterations and they create events; (2) acts and actions are different things. Acts are forms, repertoires or descriptions and actions are *actual* bodily movements; (3) bodies and subjects perform different functions; (4) intentionality and purposiveness are different registers and (5) answerability is a condition of the possibility of acts. We now shall turn our attention to each proposition.

Ruptures are not citations, repetitions or iterations. They create events

When speech act theorists such as Austin and Searle and their critics such as Derrida address issues of citation, iteration and repetition, in a way they are struggling over the vexing issue of subjectivity as action and acts. When we do things with words to what extent are we citing, iterating and repeating them (action) and to what extent are we creating and inventing them (acts)? Unlike Austin and Searle, Derrida believes that for an act to be a speech act proper, it has to be a rupture in the sense of an interruption between the sender and receiver of speech. If it were not a rupture, it would not be an act. So successful performatives always involve infelicity, misfires and misunderstandings and they are not ideal speech situations. Note that this is contrary to Bourdieu's thinking about speech as appropriate conduct versus speech as inappropriate act. Without such a distinction, we would assume a machinic citation, iteration and repetition of speech and thus assume all communication to be ideal communication, all acting as ideal acting.⁶⁹ As Loxley says 'Derrida's interventions repeatedly suggested that iterability was both the condition of the possibility of a proper speech act, and at the same time – in the same move – the condition of its impossibility.'⁷⁰

Butler though goes further. She insists that we need a term to describe what happens when citationality and iterability exceed their possibilities, reveal their vulnerabilities and open up opportunities for subversion – acting otherwise. Butler names this 'resignification'. Acts can cite, iterate and repeat but they can also do so differently and not necessarily as more of the same.⁷¹ But how do we know when an act is resignification rather than iteration? Again, we would need to return to the idea of rupture.

We had earlier encountered the idea of rupture when discussing 'we, the people'. Both Rancière and Laclau described the moment when politics arises as a rupture. For Rancière, politics is an interruption of the dominant order.⁷² Similarly, Laclau believes that the moment that we inhabit is one that will require ruptures through acts that will have aggregating effects on politics.⁷³ But what is meant by rupture? Laclau uses derivative versus constitutive to define rupture. He says, for example, the birth of a people as a historical actor creates a configuration that is not derivative but constitutive.⁷⁴ But in what sense can we delineate derivative from constitutive? The birth of a people 'constitutes an *act* in the strict sense, for it does not have its source in anything external to itself'.⁷⁵ Laclau also uses words such as transgressive and subversive to define rupture. This transgression is an act that does not simply replace existing order but introduces a different order.⁷⁶ This is

because the act, on the one hand, brings about a new (ontic) order, but, on the other, has an ordering (ontological) function, it is the locus of a

complex game by which a concrete content actualizes, through its very concreteness, something that is entirely different from itself . . .⁷⁷

Yet, this is not a revolutionary or spectacular act, or rather an act is never revolutionary or spectacular, precisely because it cannot define itself in advance. For a rupture to be transgression or subversion, it cannot name in advance its own effects.⁷⁸

Still, for both Rancière and Laclau, the concept of rupture (and its relation to acts) remains ambiguous and certainly undertheorized. Laclau identifies his concept of the act with that of Lacan's 'passage to the act' but this is problematic, as we shall see later. Similarly, we find the idea of rupture as the essence of politics in Badiou. For him 'all resistance is a rupture with what is. And every rupture begins, for those engaged in it, through a rupture with oneself.'⁷⁹ Badiou insists that 'the essence of politics is not the plurality of opinions. It is the prescription of a possibility in rupture with what exists.'⁸⁰ He suggests that what accomplishes these ruptures are declarations, interventions and organizations. Yet, Badiou does not relate rupture to acts let alone considering rupture as the essence of acts. Instead, Badiou considers something an act only if it is revolutionary in the sense of bringing about a radical transformation.

Derrida too struggles with the idea of rupture. He increasingly identifies the force of performativity with rupture. In many ways, he is critical of speech acts as exemplified especially by Austin and Searle primarily on this point.⁸¹ For Derrida

. . . the originary performativity that does not conform to preexisting conventions, unlike all the performatives analyzed by the theoreticians of speech acts, but whose force of rupture produces the institution or the constitution, the law itself, which is to say also the meaning that appears to, that ought to, or that appears to have to guarantee it in return.⁸²

Contrasting performativity with performance (citational, repetitive, iterative), Derrida thinks that if an iterative event intervenes in performativity, it is always accidental and not intrinsic.⁸³

For Butler what is politically significant about rupture is ' . . . the moment in which a subject – a person, a collective – asserts a right or entitlement to a liveable life when no such prior authorization exists, when no clearly enabling convention is in place.'⁸⁴ To put it in other words, for Butler, the force of performativity is its creativity insofar as an act is 'not inherited from prior usage, but issues forth precisely from its break with any and all prior usage. That break, that force of rupture, is the force of the performative'.⁸⁵ Still, what exactly does it mean to say or do something that will not inherit its force from prior usage but break with it? This is where a rupture and an

event become conflated. We can provisionally suggest that what reveals an act as a rupture is the event that the act produces. As Derrida says

. . . that wherever there is some performative, that is, in the strict and Austinian sense of the term, the mastery in the first person present of an ‘I can,’ ‘I may’ guaranteed and legitimated by conventions, well, then, all pure eventness is neutralized, muffled, suspended.⁸⁶

If indeed a performative utterance produces the event of which it speaks, it is this aspect that transforms a performative utterance into an act without prior convention. The difference between performativity and enactment is slight and nuanced but important. We shall use performativity to indicate citation, repetition and iteration of forms, repertoires and descriptions under which political subjectivity is produced. We shall use enactment to shift the focus on actions that bring about events as rupture in the order of things in a given site where political subjectivity is constituted.

We have seen that the idea of rupture has troubled theorists for whom the essence of politics is the interruption or disruption of an existing order of domination. What is evocative about using rupture is its ambiguity: it gains meaning only when it is demonstrated or illustrated. We cannot address these issues further here, but to get a better grip on the uses of ‘enacting citizenship’, we can consider rupture as an event that acts produce. It turns out that the capacity to bring something new into the world is a lot more complex than it appears.

***Acts and actions are different things. Acts
are forms, repertoires and descriptions;
actions are bodily movements***

Acts are not actions. This is among the most counter-intuitive propositions of enacting citizenship. To follow Hacking, although he does not make an explicit distinction between acts and actions, we can say that acts are descriptions.⁸⁷ As Hacking says ‘What is curious about human action is that by and large what I am deliberately doing depends on the possibilities of description.’⁸⁸ All acts are acts under a description and as descriptions change so do the possibilities of acting. These descriptions are not merely constative but also performative descriptions precisely because ‘. . . numerous kinds of human beings and human acts come into being hand in hand with our invention of the ways to name them’.⁸⁹ As I write this, for example, a newspaper reports that a couple has been arrested and charged with ‘preparing acts of terrorism’.⁹⁰ At first, that phrasing sounds odd. How does one prepare for an act if an act is said to be a rupture? But rupture, to repeat, does not necessarily imply spontaneity although an act can also

occur 'without preparation'. The issue here is that we can conceive others and ourselves acting only under certain descriptions and these descriptions are open to interpretation, contestation and classification with or without our or their intervention or awareness. The police have clearly identified various actions that they allege the couple engaged in, and interpreted or classified these under the description 'acts of terrorism'. What constitutes an act of terrorism is contested and it arises from various practices of naming, analyzing and interpreting actions through legal, ethical and social norms and rules. It also changes as actions that come under that description or are done in its name are constantly added or removed from its repertoires. This example illustrates the difference between acts (as descriptions) and actions. That the police clearly interpreted certain actions under this description does not mean that its classification will remain stable. Acts always involve interpretation. Which actions should come under which forms, repertoires and descriptions always remains contested.

We can think about 'acts of generosity', 'acts of hospitality', 'acts of hostility', 'acts of war' and so on in these ways. These descriptions always change and include or exclude a range of actions to constitute them. What about 'acts of citizenship'? The repertoire of actions that can come under the description 'acts of citizenship' is vast. It can include such actions as voting, serving in the military, paying taxes, fulfilling jury duty, volunteering for non-profit organizations, donating for charitable purposes and perhaps running for political office. How do we reconcile these actions with the requirement that acts produce events and that these events are ruptures? Would these actions come under the description 'acts of citizenship' if it is required that they produce ruptures? To answer that question, we need to further specify the meaning of acts of citizenship. As discussed earlier, regarding the essence of political subjectivity, what renders the emergence of a political subject is the demand (Laclau) or claim (Rancière) that an action has articulated. Moreover, the demand or claim involves the articulation of a wrong; it is a demand for and claim to justice (Derrida). Finally, such claims or demands institute equality in the sense that their articulation does not necessarily issue from a previous convention (Butler).

So identifying certain actions in order to consider whether they should come under the description 'acts of citizenship' is not about classifying those actions in the abstract but about investigating the grounds on which they involve claims or demands and their consequences.

Bodies and subjects perform different functions

We have distinguished bodies and subjects on several occasions without dwelling on its significance. Considering citizenship as political subjectivity then entails understanding the conditions under which bodies are implicated in those claims and demands that constitute them as subjects.

Becoming political subjects does not mean becoming singular in the sense of becoming only 'political' subjects. Both the ways in which a body becomes political and bodies themselves are multiple. It would not come as a surprise that our bodies inhabit various subject positions such as Canadian, teacher, brother, swimmer, consumer, Muslim, theorist and so on. These subject positions are themselves descriptions under which we act and the ways in which we take up these positions involves processes of subjectivity or subjectivation. It is also not surprising to say that no two bodies will occupy or take up the exact same combination of subject positions. So when we say 'subjects', these are the positions that bodies occupy or inhabit. Sometimes when we attribute action to a subject, we do not mean to indicate that a subject position is acting but we are referring to body that is acting under a description, a subject position.

Yet, it is not only subject positions (and the ways in which bodies are subjectivated into them) that are multiple. Our bodies are sites of contestation of multiple forces arising from and giving rise to subjectivation. To say this is to accept that a body contains tensions of conflicting desires and drives. Taking up a subject position of being a Muslim may come to conflict with becoming secular. Similarly, becoming a Canadian can come into conflict with becoming European. But then again these descriptions can change. Can one act under the description of secular Muslim? Can one become both Canadian and European? It was not that long ago, for example, that nation-states did not allow dual nationality as it was seen as a conflict to hold dual national identities and to perform one without threat to the other. Yet, that description is changing. Now some (though not many) nation-states are allowing for dual nationalities.

The aim of this discussion is to highlight the fact that we need to be precise in using terms bodies and subjects when describing acts under which actions are performed. But, more importantly, it is also to illustrate that 'subjects' do not already exist prior to acts; the performance of acts through actions bring them into being. A secular Muslim, if there is such a thing, will not come into being unless a subject comes into being under that description that produces it. Conversely, unless there is a performative utterance that produces the event through which a subject 'secular Muslim' comes about, that description will not have an effective existence. This is a good moment to return to the force of the performative as rupture. What may constitute rupture here is precisely that there may not be a previously existing convention that authorizes to act under the description of secular Muslim.

Intentionality and purposiveness are different registers

Again, Hacking is relevant here. He says performing an action always requires an intention, that is, an intention to act under some description.

But does this intention express deliberation, calculation and planning? Does it indicate that the subject is conscious of its effects and in control of its unfolding? Clearly, acting under a description is not adequate to address the issues of intentionality. The question is how that description is taken up and whether it is performed (citation, iteration and repetition) or enacted (rupture). If we understand intentionality to mean an ends–means calculation that motivates the subject, and that the subject exists prior to the act that it intends to bring about, then we are thinking at a different register. As we have seen, earlier bodies caught in an act often do not have the possibility for such calculations but orient themselves towards a scene. This orientation is purposive because bodies sense the subject position they are taking up but are neither able to calculate nor predict its outcomes. If we understand intentionality as action directed towards an outcome under a recognized and recognizable description, we are underestimating non-intentional but purposive ways in which bodies uptake subject positions. Becoming subjects and acting under descriptions, and the question of what happens when bodies occupy or inhabit these positions, all involve registers of intentionality and purposiveness.

Answerability is the condition of possibility of acts

If all acts are acts under descriptions, what compels us to act under one description rather than another? Again, this perhaps cannot be answered in the abstract as it will depend on the grounds on which an act is performed and its consequences. But often what gives direction, guidance or orientation to acts or acting under description are those responsibilities that implicate or interpellate certain bodies. Here I could exemplify this by returning to the example of conscientious objection (Act 3) mentioned in Chapter 1. Instead, let me try again with a more mundane example to illustrate that an act may require nerve at the same time as not being heroic. I am writing this sentence in a library whose reading room, for example, states various user rules and requirements in a booklet that sprawls into six pages. I am told that I must show my library card for inspection, that I should use only pencils, that my hands should be clean when handling books and documents, that I should turn the sound of my laptop off, and that my phone should be on silent mode. In addition, I should not bring bags or umbrellas, pens, highlighters, sharp implements, food, drink or gum and certainly not cameras into the reading room. These are the responsibilities that I agree to when I am performing under the description of ‘reader’ at this library. These responsibilities ensure that all readers enjoy the privileges of the library as equal readers. These responsibilities are enforced by the library staff but also are observed and corrected by readers themselves. I am justified to ask the reader sitting next to me to decrease the volume on

her earphones precisely because of our equal responsibilities but I am not entitled to do so in the square outside as it is governed by different responsibilities. Such responsibilities then govern how we perform ourselves. But is this acting? That such responsibilities are already codified means that they have become citational, repetitive and iterational and that performing as a reader requires creatively and actively but nonetheless routinely following these rules.

What if I break them? What if I become irresponsible? That would be a rupture and it would be acting under a certain description and it would have consequences of legality and illegality. But what if I act under a description I feel is justified given the circumstances? What if I cite a different rule, repeat a different norm, iterate a different regulation that, collectively, constitute an unauthorized convention? As Rancière might say, my act becomes *improper* to its immediate grounds but grounded in a different – and perhaps an equally if not more effectively justifiable – reason. This is where the concept of answerability becomes essential. Our acts may contravene our responsibilities but are answerable to the principles for their enactment. In fact, as emphasized, answerability is basic to understanding acts. Yet, there is nothing mystical about answerability. Just consider a Bradley Manning (Act 3) or Rachel Corrie (Act 2) or Daniel Barenboim (Act 20) here. Each acts against a wrong (injustice) and under a convention that does not authorize them to occupy or inhabit the description each chooses.

Acts of citizenship

The foregoing is merely an outline of the basic qualities of acts and specifically acts of citizenship where the concepts performativity and enactment are its key aspects. Citation, repetition and iterability are the qualities of performativity, whereas rupture and answerability are fundamental to enactment. Taken together, familiar concepts such as action, events, bodies, subject positions, intentionality, purposiveness and responsibility acquire new inflections and nuances. But how then do we go about investigating acts? Beyond the theoretical propositions we have discussed, are there methodological propositions? We have already focused on some basic qualities and principles for investigating acts. We have identified creativity, inventiveness and autonomy as the basic qualities of acts. We then made a distinction between performativity and enactment focusing on rupture as a key distinguishing quality. We then distinguished between acts and actions, subjects and bodies, intentionality and purposiveness, and responsibility and answerability. Taken together, these propositions enable us to identify acts as objects of investigation and the acts featured in this book illustrate these propositions. Still, we need to discuss four methodological

propositions concerning acts: (1) events; (2) sites; (3) scales and (4) durations. We will then have a vocabulary or analytics for investigating acts.

Investigating acts

The beginning point of investigating an act is always an event. As you may have already noticed when reading the acts in this book, I usually begin with an event. It is the event that reveals or discloses an act and it is the event that embodies its rupture effect. But what is an event? As innocuous as it sounds that question is incredibly complex but I will keep my answer tightly connected to acts so that we can get a reasonably stable grip on it. Similarly, ‘where’ an event happens and its ‘reach’ and ‘duration’ are complex issues. I will introduce these propositions for investigating acts with illustrations not to give you a sense that they neatly resolve all problems but to convince you that we are better off with this vocabulary and analytics than not.

Events happen but not all that happens are events

Actions happen all the time. They have the character of being routine, ordinary and occur at a certain time and place. Sometimes, actions condense or accelerate the experiences of those who either witness or commit them. But such actions are repetitions or citations. By contrast, events are actions that become recognizable (visible, articulable) only when the site, scale and duration of these actions produce a rupture in the given order. But by an order I not only mean grand things such as social, political or economic orders but any assemblage of relatively lasting and enduring ways of doing things. You may remember the example of the library that I used to introduce the difference between responsibility and answerability. Well, I am still there and things are happening. People are carrying books and some are even reading them, some people are looking at their screens and are so enchanted that I am tempted to ask what makes them smile like that. The staff is shelving books. There is an announcement about the closing time. All this is happening around me. But none of it constitutes (so far) an event. A given state of affairs or an order of things is held together and creating a setting or situation. What must happen for this order not to continue its relative stability? Some thing happens and changes the state of affairs or the order of things. This is often expressed as ‘things will never be the same’ or ‘things were never the same after.’

As I write these sentences, ‘street riots’ are occurring in London.⁹¹ I am still in the library but now I am following reports on the internet. On

Friday, 4 August 2011, Mark Duggan, 29, is shot dead by police at Ferry Lane, Tottenham.⁹² This death occurs during an arrest by police officers dealing with gun crime in 'the African and Caribbean communities.' On 6 August, about 300 people gather outside Tottenham police station asking questions about the circumstances of Duggan's death. The confirmation of his death has not communicated to the family after 48 hours. The group chooses Broadwater Farm estate, the site of a riot in 1985 against another shooting, thus linking their questions to a longer grievance about shootings associated with murderous police repression of blacks in the city. Following the march, riots and violence break out. Police cars and a bus are burned, several buildings set alight and considerable looting is perpetrated often but not in all cases by masked youths.⁹³

Of course, the details, reasons and effects of these riots are extraordinarily complex and there will be much discussion for years to come. But because this is unfolding at the moment, it helps me think through some of the theoretical issues that I am trying to articulate here. Is this an event? If so, what is the event? Is there an act here that produces the event? When and how do we exactly settle these questions? We can begin with those actions that produced the event that we want to identify: the shooting, the gathering, the burning and the looting create an event in the sense that they interrupt or rupture the given state of affairs. Without the gathering outside the police station serving as a symbolic starting point for the march, would the action of shooting have become an event? It is the gathering and questioning that turned it into an event about demanding justice. Without further actions, it could have been interpreted as an act of citizenship demanding an explanation and justice for yet another shooting of a black man under questionable circumstances. But since the original event was followed by further actions such as burning and looting, the event escalated into another scale to include 'acts of violence' and 'acts of rage'. Descriptions of the acts as well as the subjects that they produced are contested and confusing. Media interpretations range between 'demonstrators' and 'protesters' before they settle on 'rioters'. Clearly, the ground is shifting rapidly and the classification of actions, acts and actors are becoming a stake in the struggle over meaning. Similarly, the interpretations of acts range from 'disturbances' to 'riots'. The important thing to note here is that these acts and their subjects, as we have stressed before, do not exist as such but are interpretations or descriptions that constitute acts.⁹⁴ To put it differently, acts (or actions interpreted as acts) become contestations about events and how to interpret them. Surely, there is a huge difference between interpreting the events that unfolded in London as 'acts of citizenship' demanding justice or as 'acts of violence' expressing rage, fury and feral conduct?

These events also produce sites (as various actions spread from Tottenham to Enfield, and Brixton).⁹⁵ They shift the scale of acts in the sense of their reverberations and spheres of influence. If these riots remain confined

within the sites currently identified, the events that they produced and the rupture in the given that they have created will have different effects than if they ‘spread’ to other sites especially outside London to other British cities. Moreover, for how long these events will remain linked to a series of events in the past such as the symbolic link made between the gathering outside the police station and the 1985 shooting at the Broadwater Farm estate remains to be seen. So the sites, scales and duration of an act are related and affect the rupture that it produces. This brief discussion on an event I hope gives you a sense of how we can begin investigating acts by deducing them as contested interpretations of actions and events. And let us not forget that we are always interested in citizenship as political subjectivity so we are not interested in all actions and events but those that constitute subject as claimants of rights and justice and thus a political.

Sites are not places or spaces

Tottenham High Road, Broadwater Estate farm and Brixton are places but Tottenham Riots, Brixton Riots and Broadwater Estate Riots are sites: They are ephemeral actual events that become enduring virtual remembrances. These are sites of contestation or struggle around which certain issues, interests, stakes as well as themes, concepts and objects assemble. While sites are spatial, they are not merely locations or places. To put it another way, sites are places or locations only insofar as social or political struggles invested in these places or locations with strategic values express them symbolically or materially. All locations or places will have values or meanings associated with them but what renders a location or place as a site is the strategic value for the struggle for rights that is the basis of enacting citizenship. Thus sites are both temporal and temporary. But this is the case only if we think of them as merely physical places. They also become imaginary spaces to which actors in the future will orient. So ‘Tottenham’ is not only a physical place but also an imaginary space that evokes resonant images.

Scales are not nested and hierarchical levels

As mentioned earlier, sites and scales are not mutually exclusive and discrete but overlapping and connected elements of acts. So when investigating an act, it is always important to consider the overlapping and connected aspects of sites and scales through which various actions enact acts. Sometimes it is necessary to use site-scales together and sometimes as separate attributes, depending on the specific situation under investigation. As also noted earlier, sites and scales are central categories because when we use already existing categories such as states, nations, cities, sexualities,

ethnicities and so on, we inevitably deploy them as ‘containers’ with fixed and given boundaries. These are jurisdictions: territorialized authority. By contrast, when we begin with ‘sites’ and ‘scales’ with fluid and dynamic elements formed through contests and struggles, their boundaries become a question of empirical determination.

We have seen that sites are places that are invested with strategic value for struggles that claim rights. Scale is a significant concept to investigate acts as it indicates the reach and scope of various actions assembled and interpreted as acts. Especially when considered in conjunction with the phrase ‘staging an act’, the reach and scope of the act staged determines its effects. When we often say that certain actions *exceed* their intentions, we mean that the reach of their effect is exceeding the boundaries convention that authorizes them. Thus, the scale of an act – its reach and scope – becomes a crucial element for understanding its effects.

Duration is not fixed and given

How long does an act last? The question is not about the actual time it takes for an event to happen. For, as we have seen, sites of actions last as long as the actions themselves. By contrast, acts last much longer than actions or events. To produce events and acts, descriptions must retain a certain intensity. Otherwise, they lose their performative force. The time it takes for a description to gain and lose its performative force through which subjects become political is a matter of empirical investigation and cannot be determined theoretically. We can illustrate this again by returning to the London ‘riots’.

On the first night of the riots, a journalist recorded a speech act by a woman who confronted and berated youths for looting shops.⁹⁶ Later named as the ‘heroine of Hackney’, a video clip shows Pauline Pearce passionately and angrily telling youths that if they have a cause, then they should riot for it rather than destroy the businesses of ordinary people who worked hard to build them.⁹⁷ So far, this speech act lacks the performative force and rupture that constitutes an act. Why? Watching the clip, the viewer realizes that Pearce is not only being ignored by everyone present but also seemingly lacks addressees – an audience to receive the speech and its performative force. It seems that this speech act is greeted with indifference at the moment of its actual performance. Yet, its recording and subsequent transmission through both YouTube and other media, begins to transform her action into an ‘act of reason’, ‘act of heroism’ and ‘act of bravery’. Various video artists picked up the footage and turned it into a speech act with subtitles and music (some featuring Bob Marley). Thus, an action that could have disappeared as soon as it was performed became an act with performative force. But did it transform anything? Did it interrupt

a state of affairs or the order of things and thus constitute an act, let alone an act of citizenship? If we consider the moment of its performance as the only criterion, the answer would have to be negative. But its interpretation (and thus actualization) as an act occurs later and it takes time. Thus, the duration of the act cannot be reduced to the moment of its performance, it must include its subsequent interpretation and description.

Activism as traversal citizenship

So far, this chapter focused on elaborating on how to think about and investigate citizenship as political subjectivity. There is no need to repeat the whole vocabulary and analytics now. Instead, the idea here is to show that investigating citizenship as political subjectivity, approaching citizenship as acts rather than status or habitus involve quite difficult tasks. I think it has rewards and so we need to persevere as there is one more piece to this jigsaw puzzle. How do we distinguish those acts of citizenship that traverse frontiers from those that do not? How and when can we claim that an act remains 'within' frontiers? Does traversing concern only bodies and subjects or does it also involve the sites, scales and durations of acts? Earlier we discussed that 'frontiers' are not merely a metaphor for 'limits' but are actual spaces through which subjectivities are formed. We also discussed topological ways of thinking about spaces and identified, with Mol, Law and Allen, regions, networks, fluids and fires as kinds of spaces through which subjectivities are formed. Frontiers encompass regions, networks, fluids and fires to create dynamic spaces of doable, sayable and visible. Frontiers are interstitial spaces that traverse these four kinds of spaces. This is a key aspect of the figure of citizens without frontiers. To think of frontiers as interstitial spaces requires imagining them as dynamic zones that traverse these four kinds of spaces. Traversing these spaces involves reaching out, extending and conducting ourselves as if we are others. It now remains to show that citizens without frontiers are traversal subjects. That is what the next chapter considers.

ACT 14. OF SPEECH: WAGING PEACE

In 2007, a box containing 30,000 testimonials from refugees on the border of war-stricken Darfur was sent to the charity, Waging Peace.⁹⁸ A couple of months later, another 30,000 testimonials had been collected from those living in the camps. In April 2008, Downing Street received a petition bearing 60,000 signatures.⁹⁹ This was the largest petition ever sent by African citizens to the United Kingdom. This act of petition poses a simple but a powerful question: How will you exercise your responsibility despite borders? Of those who signed 70 per cent were women, making it the largest expression from women in Africa.¹⁰⁰ Amidst their personal stories of hardship and violence, collective demands were clear. Anna Schmitt, the aid worker who suggested the petition, thought the petitions expressed a straightforward intention: 'They want a UN peacekeeping force and they want an end to the violence.'¹⁰¹ Yet, every act exceeds the intentions of those who enact it. The petition had other consequences than those intended.

Admittedly, Darfur does not occupy the prime-time imagination.¹⁰² When attention is drawn to the atrocities, victims of Darfur are spoken for. This was reflected in a strong correlation between a surge in celebrity advocacy and heightened coverage of Darfur and when polls showed little public interest otherwise.¹⁰³ Little of this activity went beyond rhetoric and sporadic charity. It is then understandable that when in 2007 Anna Schmitt was collecting evidence of the crimes committed against refugees living in the camps on the border, village elders expressed their pessimism about the effectiveness of representing Darfuri through traditional advocacy.¹⁰⁴

Schmitt wanted to break away from the routine of others representing Darfuris. She came up with an alternative means through which Darfuris could speak for themselves: a petition. This act of petition was unique. It partly revived an older tradition of usage in situations when constitutional arrangements were absent. An oft-cited example is that of 1770s' Connecticut when the majority of government legislation was based on petition recommendations.¹⁰⁵ Although the petition has lost this function of affirmation, it has become a tool of appeal (when it is recognized by the state and) through which citizens can directly raise grievances and question of policy as a matter of political debate, and if successful a matter of legislation.¹⁰⁶ In fact, it is worth remembering that what gained the internet its initial democratic credential was precisely the proliferation of online petitions with collected emails standing for signatures. The act of petition occupies a special space in democratic claim making.

Yet, what makes this act of petition by mostly Darfuri women outstanding is the authority of the appeal. Why the UK government? There is no direct link between the 60,000 petitioners and the UK state, except for the intermediary bodies of aid agencies and peacekeepers (or absence thereof), which, in this instance, was bypassed. The petition by the 60,000 refugees was not addressed to an already established authority obligated to hear it. Rather, it vests that authority at the same time that it appeals to it.

This absence of authority was embodied in its very form: 'the camp elders had absorbed the concept of a petition and elaborated it into a human tapestry

of personal testimony.¹⁰⁷ The petition was an assortment of both demands and stories, or rather demands within stories. Although it was not a traditional 'sign below' to an agreed set of grievances, consensus surfaced through qualitative similarity. For example, Hanna narrates a harrowing tale of how the Janjawid killed and raped villagers. Thirteen-year-old Sumaiya describes similar events, in defiance finishing with: 'I am Darfurian, I am Sudanese. I will not fear anything, not even death. It is my right to go back to my home.' Mothers stated: 'we the mothers want them to enter Darfur immediately. They have displaced us, and killed us and raped us in front of our children and husbands. They killed our children and burnt our houses. This was all done by the Janjaweed in our homeland.' Others voiced these demands by arguing that '[w]e support resolution 1706. We want the Janjaweed disarmed and the war criminals brought to trial; they have committed serious crimes: crimes against humanity.'¹⁰⁸ This was as much an act of petition as it was an act of testimony.

The petition was not accepted in the House of Commons debates. It was unheard. The act of a petition by citizens without frontiers transgressed the relationship between state and citizen as bounded entities. The only petition on Darfur discussed in the 2008 Commons session was in response to one submitted by West Oxfordshire students. On this matter, Hansard documented that 'The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to move the issue of the Darfur genocide to the top of the political agenda and media spotlight, and to keep it there.'¹⁰⁹ The House agreed with it. The performative force of the 2008 Darfuri petition was that it did not reach its destination.

ACT 15. OF FURY: MARIYAM MANIKE

I was never political until the death of my son, Hassan Evan Naseem. I became political at that moment. Now, the reform movement in the Maldives is everything to me. The day we voted in a new government in our first democratic election – on October 28 – was the greatest of my life, but it still couldn't bring my son back.¹¹⁰

How does one become a political subject? What does such a moment produce? These are extraordinarily complex questions. Yet, those moments are poignantly simple when told by those who experience them. Can we hear them? Can we listen to their voices as irreducibly singular yet recognizably traversal enactments?

'Your son died last night.' Those are the words Mariyam Manike heard in the early hours of 20 September 2003 at her home in Malé, Maldives.¹¹¹ She received the news from a prison guard and was advised to go to the hospital.¹¹² Mariyam saw the body of her 19-year-old son, who had been incarcerated in the Maafushi Jail for drug possession at the age of 17 years.¹¹³ Upon noticing that his body was covered in bruises, Mariyam knew that he had been tortured.¹¹⁴ For Mariyam, this moment sparked a transformation: 'I was never political until the death of my son, Hassan Evan Naseem. I became political at that moment.'¹¹⁵ The hospital staff attempted to contain her subsequent outburst, but she resisted and shouted to 'everyone who came there to go on the streets and say someone has been killed in jail'.¹¹⁶

Soon after the hospital released the body, the authorities sent it to the cemetery. Yet Mariyam told them to postpone the burial. She felt this would have prematurely buried the evidence before anyone could see what Hassan experienced during the last moments of his life and what caused his death.¹¹⁷ Mariyam showed the body to those who gathered in the cemetery. She wanted everyone to see and share in the sense of injustice. Eventually, the president came to the cemetery, stating that he would 'look into it'.¹¹⁸ What followed was a contrived inquiry, which located primary responsibility with the Maafushi Jail Security Unit, finding them to have acted contrary to Maldivian law.¹¹⁹ The expression of formal rights did not guarantee their substantive implementation. In terms of the sentencing that followed, Fufaru, the individual who gave the order that Evan should be transferred to the notorious 'Range' section of the prison (where he suffered the fatal injuries), was sentenced to 6 months in prison.¹²⁰

After Evan's death, Mariyam joined the 'reform movement' and became actively involved in the Maldivian Democratic Party.¹²¹ With Mariyam's call for mobilization and justice, she helped transform what was bound to remain yet another concealed case of torture leading to death, into an event. Her act prepared the grounds for mobilizing people against a regime. This contextualization of a particular incident to a wider call for justice and democracy was one of the central acts that instigated the riots following his death.¹²² 'Evan Hassan,' was translated from the name of a victim to a call for reform. From 20 to 21 September 2003, crowds gathered outside government buildings and set fire to armoured cars and jeeps,

in a show of protest against the death of Evan and another inmate. Relatives and friends of the deceased displayed an 'unusual show of protest against the government of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who has been in power for 25 years'.¹²³ After 5 years of struggle and intermittent but effective mobilizations, the president stepped down in 2008 after losing the country's first-ever democratic election to Mohamed Nasheed.¹²⁴ While ushering in a new constitution, elections and a democratic regime were due to numerous factors, torture and the lack of civil liberties were implied as the major instigating grounds for outrage.¹²⁵ The importance of Mariyam's act can be surmised in her own words: 'my son's murder helped bring down a dictatorship.'¹²⁶

The subsequent remembrance of Evan also became a political act, irrevocably tethered to justice and democracy. Idhikeeli, a pro-democracy group, held a vigil in 2007 to remember Evan Hassan. The police treated this as a threatening act while for participants it was a rallying call for justice.¹²⁷ This further reflects how various actors conceive of the symbolic status of Evan, which Mariyam carved through her act of disseminating her grief and political opposition.

Mariyam now continues to fight even after the institution of a democratic government. Unsatisfied that justice had been delivered by either the sentence of Fusfaru or the subsequent prosecution of the eight police officers who were charged with murder but only placed under house arrest, Mariyam sought to pursue the case further.¹²⁸ In 2009, Mariyam aimed to hold Maumoon Abdul Gayoom and 'senior officials of the defence ministry' as culpable in Evan's death.¹²⁹ In particular, the struggle to convict Adam Zahir, the chief of police who was allegedly in command of those tortures, continues for Mariyam Manike.¹³⁰

Mariyam's act of becoming political is at once so particular and traversal. It is particular as it intensifies the tragic pain of a mother realizing that her son was tortured to death. But her act of becoming political traverses frontiers and joins acts of fury against injustice enacted by mothers from Argentina to Turkey.

Notes

- 1 É. Balibar, 'Culture and Identity,' in *The Identity in Question*, ed. J. Rajchman (New York: Routledge, 1995).
- 2 Note that this phrase is different from 'the right to have rights' as is commonly attributed to Hannah Arendt. See A. Schaap, 'Enacting the Right to Have Rights: Jacques Rancière's Critique of Hannah Arendt,' *European Journal of Political Theory* 10 (2010); M. R. Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). The phrase was also used by a United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren in 1958 in a dissenting decision when he said 'Citizenship is man's basic right, because it is nothing less than the right to have rights.' See M. M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America, Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 127.
- 3 The relationship between human rights and citizenship is very complex and we cannot discuss it here. A. Brysk and G. Shafir, 'Globalization and the Citizenship Gap,' in *People Out of Place: Globalization, Human Rights, and the Citizenship Gap*, ed. A. Brysk and G. Shafir (London: Routledge, 2004); See K. Nash, 'Between Citizenship and Human Rights,' *Sociology* 43, 1067–84 (2009); M. R. Somers and C. N. J. Roberts, 'Toward a New Sociology of Rights: A Genealogy of "Buried Bodies" of Citizenship and Human Rights,' *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 4 (2008).
- 4 This is by far the most dominant approach to citizenship and the literature has grown phenomenally. When my colleague Bryan Turner and I surveyed the field, we were rather shocked by its rapid development since Bryan founded the journal in 1997, which we have been editing jointly since 1999. See E. F. Isin and B. S. Turner, eds, *Handbook of Citizenship Studies* (London: Sage, 2002). Since then, the field of citizenship studies continued to grow and there is no volume that can capture even that part of the literature whose approach I designate as 'status'. See E. Guild, 'Security and Migration in the 21st Century,' *Security and Migration in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); C. Joppke, *Citizenship and Immigration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).
- 5 Perhaps the best contribution – at least it is most cited – to approaching citizenship as status through perspective of rights is T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*, ed. T. B. Bottomore, *Pluto Perspectives* (London: Pluto Press, 1949). Also see Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights*.
- 6 The term habitus used analytically by Pierre Bourdieu to indicate those habits that we learn by doing over relatively long periods of time so much so that it becomes our habitus, that is, embedded in our bodies that we take it for granted and repeat without much thinking or questioning. He was interested in things such as the learned 'feel for the game' (whether it is a political or sports game) and dispositions. See P. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). His *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987) is a classic deployment of his idea on how we acquire taste as habitus. This idea

is especially useful to designate how people learn to conduct themselves and expect others to do the same.

- 7 See R. Barnes et al., 'Citizenship in Practice,' *British Journal of Social Psychology* 43 (2004); Schattle, *The Practices of Global Citizenship*.
- 8 D. T. Evans, *Sexual Citizenship: The Material Construction of Sexualities* (London: Routledge, 1993); W. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford Political Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); A. Latta, 'Environmental Citizenship,' *Alternatives Journal* 33, 1 (2007); A. Linklater, 'Cosmopolitan Citizenship,' *Citizenship Studies* 2, 1 (1998).
- 9 Jeff Goodell, 'Meet America's Most Creative Climate Criminal,' *The Rolling Stones*, 7 July 2011 [cited 24 February 2012]. Source: <http://goo.gl/WRCu5>
- 10 Suzanne Goldenberg, *The Guardian*, 'US eco-activist jailed for two years,' *Wednesday*, 27 July 2011 [cited 24 February 2012]. Source: <http://goo.gl/YsWEK>
- 11 Jeff Goodell, 'Rosa Parks Moment: Climate Activist Tim DeChristopher Sentenced to Prison,' 27 July 2011 [cited 24 February 2012]. Source: <http://goo.gl/ZPq2P>
- 12 Tim DeChristopher, 'I Do Not Want Mercy, I Want You to Join Me,' Statement to Court, 27 July 2011 [cited 24 February 2012]. Source: <http://goo.gl/9Tegx>.
- 13 Suzanne Goldenberg, *The Guardian*, 'US Eco-activist Jailed for Two Years,' *Wednesday*, 27 July 2011 [cited 24 February 2012]. Source: <http://goo.gl/YsWEK>
- 14 Tim DeChristopher, 'I Do Not Want Mercy, I Want You to Join Me,' Statement to Court, 27 July 2011 [cited 24 February 2012]. Source: <http://goo.gl/9Tegx>
- 15 H. Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 8.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 9.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 176.
- 18 H. Arendt, 'Introduction into Politics,' in *The Promise of Politics*, ed. J. Kohn (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 2005), 114.
- 19 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 177–8.
- 20 H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, new with added prefaces 1973 edn (New York: Harcourt Publishers, 1951), 473.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 *Ibid.*, 474.
- 23 *Ibid.*
- 24 *Ibid.*, 479.
- 25 *Ibid.*
- 26 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 178.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 178–9.
- 28 H. Arendt, 'What Is Freedom?' in *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Viking Press, 1961), 144.
- 29 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 184.
- 30 *Ibid.*, 192.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 191–2.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 197.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 233.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 237.

- 35 Arendt, 'What Is Freedom?' 156.
- 36 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 241.
- 37 Ibid., 237.
- 38 Ibid., 245.
- 39 H. Arendt, 'Concern with Politics in Recent European Political Thought,' in *Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism*, ed. J. Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 429.
- 40 Arendt, 'What Is Freedom?' 151.
- 41 Ibid., 153.
- 42 Ibid., 169.
- 43 Ibid., 151.
- 44 Arendt, 'Introduction into Politics,' 198.
- 45 Ibid., 194.
- 46 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 152; Arendt, 'Introduction into Politics,' 194. Arendt says that she is using the term principle following Montesquieu's argument on forms of government: 'Therefore what the definition of governments always needed was what Montesquieu called a "principle of action" which, different in each form of government, would inspire government and citizens alike in their public activity and serve as a criterion, beyond the merely negative yardstick of lawfulness, for judging all action in public affairs. Such guiding principles and criteria of action are, according to Montesquieu, honour in a monarchy, virtue in a republic and fear in a tyranny.' Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 467.
- 47 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 152.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 H. Arendt, *Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics, Civil Disobedience, on Violence, Thoughts on Politics and Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 94.
- 51 Ibid., 99.
- 52 Ibid., 98.
- 53 J. D. Caputo, ed., *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, No. 1* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1996), 16–17.
- 54 See D. R. Villa, *Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); D. Walsh, *The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
- 55 V. Bell, *Culture and Performance: The Challenge of Ethics, Politics, and Feminist Theory* (Oxford: Berg, 2007); J. Loxley, *Performativity* (London: Routledge, 2007).
- 56 T. C. Davis, *The Cambridge Companion to Performance Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); D. S. Madison J. Hamera, eds, *The Sage Handbook of Performance Studies* (London: Sage, 2006); R. Schechner, *Performance Studies: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2002); R. Schechner, *Performance Theory*, rev. and expanded edn (London: Routledge, 1988). Sociologists such as E. Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959); E. Goffman, *Strategic Interaction*,

- vol. 1, *Series in Conduct and Communication* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969) and anthropologists such as V. W. Turner, *The Anthropology of Performance* (New York: PAJ Publications, 1987), and historians such as C. Tilly, *Contentious Performances* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), made significant contributions to understanding action as performance.
- 57 An excellent introduction to these genealogies is Loxley, *Performativity*. But Loxley limits his focus to linguistics and speech acts.
- 58 The debate continued with disagreements on ‘speech acts’. See J. R. Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) and J. Derrida, *Limited Inc*, trans. G. Graff (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), especially on the question of intentionality, and with interventions by S. Felman, *The Scandal of the Speaking Body: Don Juan with J.L. Austin, or Seduction in Two Languages* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). Also see J. Butler, ‘Burning Acts: Injurious Speech,’ *U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 3* (1996); J. Butler, ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution an Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,’ *Theatre Journal* 40 (1988), with their focus on how bodies are performed. Yet another distinct, albeit related, history of performativity can be traced back to M. Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of Act*, ed. M. Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993). See A. Reinach, ‘The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law,’ *Aletheia: An International Journal of Philosophy* 3 (1983): 1–142.. B. Smith and A. Burkhardt, ‘Towards a History of Speech Act Theory,’ in *Speech Acts, Meaning, and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle* (1990).
- 59 Overall, it must be said that performativity responds to an impasse of dualisms that vexed social and political thought for decades: subjectivism versus objectivism, structure versus agency, idealism versus materialism, and essentialism versus constructivism. Thus, performativity includes not only prominent theorists such as those mentioned above but also Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’. P. Bourdieu, *Language & Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*; Rancière, *On the Shores of Politics* and J. Derrida, *Without Alibi*, ed. P. Kamuf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
- 60 Clearly, the ways in which the concept performativity has been deployed in social and political thought and social sciences are complex and intricate as much as influential. Here I briefly highlight the most productive aspect of performativity and how performativity and enactment are complementary and yet distinct concepts for studying citizenship not only as a given status but also how that status is creatively transformed by its performance and enactment.
- 61 J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 109.
- 62 Bourdieu, *Language & Symbolic Power*, 125–6.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 107.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 109.
- 65 *Ibid.*, 111.

- 66 Ibid., 113.
- 67 Ibid., 115.
- 68 Obviously, I want to limit my comments on Auden's poem since I feel it provokes these questions better than any words at my command. On Auden and citizenship with some comments on 'The Unknown Citizen', see R. L. Caserio, 'Auden's New Citizenship,' *Raritan* 17, 2 (1997); J. Lucas, 'Auden's Politics: Power, Authority, and the Individual,' in *The Cambridge Companion to W.H. Auden*, ed. S. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
- 69 Loxley, *Performativity*, 97.
- 70 Ibid., 102.
- 71 J. Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 189.
- 72 Rancière says 'Politics does not happen just because the poor oppose the rich. It is the other way around: politics (that is, the interruption of the simple effects of domination by the rich) causes the poor to exist as an entity.' Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 11.
- 73 Laclau says that we 'inhabit a historical terrain where the proliferation of heterogeneous points of rupture and antagonisms require increasingly political forms of social reaggregation – that is to say, that the latter depend less on underlying social logics and more on acts. . . .' Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 230.
- 74 Ibid., 228.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Ibid., 229.
- 77 Ibid.
- 78 Ibid., 237.
- 79 A. Badiou, *Metapolitics*, trans. J. Barker (London: Verso, 2006), 24.
- 80 Ibid.
- 81 Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*; Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*.
- 82 J. Derrida, *Specters of Marx: State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International* (London: Routledge, 1994), 36–7.
- 83 Derrida, *Without Alibi*, 114.
- 84 J. Butler, *Undoing Gender* (London: Routledge, 2004), 224.
- 85 J. Butler, 'Sovereign Performatives in the Contemporary Scene of Utterance,' *Critical Inquiry* 23, 2 (1997): 148.
- 86 Derrida, *Without Alibi*, 239.
- 87 Hacking, *Historical Ontology*; I. Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
- 88 Hacking, *Historical Ontology*, 108.
- 89 Ibid., 113.
- 90 *The Guardian*. 2011. Reading the Riots. The Guardian in Partnership with the London School of Economics. Supported by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Open Society Foundations 2011 [cited 6 January 2012]. Source: <http://goo.gl/EquxH6>
- 91 It is 10:49 AM on Monday, 8 August 2011.
- 92 BBC, 'London Riots: Timeline of Violence,' 8 August 2011, <http://goo.gl/YbUZ6>

- 93 Paul Lewis, 'Tottenham Riots: A Peaceful Protest, Then Suddenly All Hell Broke Loose,' *The Guardian* [cited 24 February 2012]. Source: <http://goo.gl/YM9wC>
- 94 BBC has already asked: 'Was Tottenham's Riot a Cry of Rage?' in a report by Matt Prodger on 8 August [cited 24 February 2012]. Source: <http://goo.gl/rYhZ9>
- 95 *The Guardian*, 'London Riots Spread South of Thames,' 8 August 2011 [cited 24 February 2012]. Source: <http://goo.gl/eLDWh>
- 96 D. Gardham. 2011. 'Hackney Speech Woman' Revealed to be Local Jazz Singer. *The Telegraph* 2011 [cited 16 August 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/OyJeU>
- 97 Ibid.
- 98 D. Aitkenhead. 2008. From Darfur with Love. *The Guardian*, 24 April 2008 [cited 16 September 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/d1mkE>
- 99 Waging Peace. 2008. 25 April 2008: Petition Containing the Voices of over 60,000 Darfuris Delivered to Downing Street. Waging Peace 2008 [cited 16 September 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/fG1RM>
- 100 L. Roland-Gosselin, 'Petition: Summary' (Waging Peace, 2008).
- 101 Aitkenhead, From Darfur with Love [cited 16 September 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/d1mkE>
- 102 C. Eke, 'Darfur: Coverage of a Genocide by Three Major Us Tv Networks on Their Evening News,' *International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics* 4, 3 (2008): 284.
- 103 L. Tsaliqi et al., *Transnational Celebrity Activism in Global Politics: Changing the World?* (Chicago: Intellect Books, 2011), 93, 94.
- 104 Aitkenhead, From Darfur with Love [cited 16 September 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/d1mkE>
- 105 S. A. Higginson, 'A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances,' *The Yale Law Journal* 96, 1 (1986): 146.
- 106 Ibid.
- 107 Aitkenhead, From Darfur with Love [cited 16 September 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/d1mkE>
- 108 Darfuri Refugees, 'Selected Testimonials from Darfuri Refugees in Chad' (Waging Peace, 2007).
- 109 Hansard. 13p Parl. Deb. H.C. 14 May 2008 (House of Commons, 2008).
- 110 M. Manike. 2008. 'My Son's Murder Helped Bring Down a Dictatorship'. *Financial Times*, 13 December 2008 [cited 9 July 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/bCWpS>
- 111 Ibid.
- 112 Ibid.
- 113 Minivan News. 2008. Torture in the Jails Is Not Finished: Mariyam Manike. Minivan News, 20 September 2008 [cited 9 July 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/QcM5M>
- 114 Ibid.
- 115 Ibid.
- 116 Ibid.
- 117 Ibid.

- 118 Manike, 'My Son's Murder Helped Bring Down a Dictatorship' [cited 9 July 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/bCWpS>
- 119 Republic of Maldives. 2004. Investigative Findings on the Death of Hassan Evan Naseem. Presidential Commission, The President's Office, 27 January 2004 [cited 12 December 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/GSLk7>
- 120 Minivan News. 2005. 15 Minutes with Evan Naseem's Mother Mariyam Manike. Minivan News, 13 March 2005 [cited 9 July 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/8rmBU>
- 121 Minivan News, Torture in the Jails Is Not Finished: Mariyam Manike [cited 9 July 2011]. Source: <http://goo.gl/QcM5M>
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