I am grateful to Allen Scott, Warren Magnusson, Evelyn Ruppert, and Bryan S. Turner who read earlier drafts and provided critical comments. I am also indebted to the participants in the Global City-Regions conference and of a seminar at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cambridge, who have provided critical response to earlier drafts of this chapter.
Engin F. Isin

believe in the disappearance of such allegiances. Either way, postmodernization of politics has, therefore, stressed the capacity of the modern nation-state and citizenship to accommodate and recognize these diverse and conflicting demands.

If we define globalization as both a process by which the increasing interconnectedness of places becomes the defining moment and as a discourse through which “globalism” becomes a dominant ideology, its effect on citizenship has also been twofold. On the one hand, with the rise of global flows of capital, images, ideas, labor, crime, music, and regimes of governance, the sources of authority of citizenship rights and obligations have expanded from the nation-state to other international organizations, corporations, and agencies such as the World Bank, IMF, IBM, Internet, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Microsoft, and Coca-Cola. On the other hand, the dominance of such global agents was accompanied by the decline of the ability of the nation-states to set sovereign policies. In a very complex relay of events, nation-states retrenched from certain citizenship rights and instead imposed new obligations on their citizens, which intensified tensions within states where taken-for-granted citizenship rights began to disappear (e.g. unemployment insurance, welfare, or right to legal counsel) and new obligations (e.g. workfare) were implemented. Similarly, increased international migration has raised the question of rights and responsibilities of aliens, immigrants, and refugees.

While some believe that globalization means the rise of the world as one single place, others dispute whether globalization has become as widespread as claimed and point to increased postmodernization of culture and politics where diversity, fragmentation, and difference dominate. But few would disagree that both postmodernization and globalization are occurring simultaneously and are engendering new patterns of global differentiation in which some states, societies, and social groups are becoming increasingly enmeshed with each other while others are becoming increasingly marginalized. A new configuration of power relations is crystalizing as the old geographic divisions rapidly give way to new spaces such that the familiar triad of core-periphery, north–south, and First World–Third World no longer represents these new spaces. Globalization has recast modern patterns of inclusion and exclusion between nation-states by forging new hierarchies, which cut across and penetrate all regions of the world (Held et al. 1999: 8). North and south, First World and Third World, are no longer “out there” but nestled together within global city-regions. It is doubtful whether we can any longer divide the world into discrete, contiguous, and contained zones as a representation of reality. Instead, the sociopolitical geography of the world seems to be crystalizing as overlapping networks of various flows of intensity in which global city-regions are the primary nodes. These complex overlapping networks connect the fate of one global city-region to the fate of another in distant parts of the world.

As such, postmodernization and globalization are not simply a continuation of modern capitalism on a global scale, but political, economic, and cultural transformations of modern capitalism into new regimes of accumulation and
modes of regulation (Hoogvelt 1997). That cities and regions, or more precisely, global city-regions, are the fundamental spaces of this emerging political economy further erodes the credibility of modernization theories that would have us believe in national trajectories that will follow the disappearance of religion, tradition, and particularism. Instead, in global city-regions we are witnessing a general trend toward the proliferation of identities and projects and an overall incredulity toward grand narratives. If global city-regions give us not only the geographic metaphors with which we think about the social world, they are also the concrete sites in which to investigate the complex relays of postmodernization and globalization (Isin 2000). This chapter outlines some observations on Istanbul, which vividly illustrates that globalization and postmodernization engender spaces for new identities and projects, which modernization either contained or prohibited, and generate new citizenship rights and obligations.

A “global city” for more than fifteen centuries, first as an imperial city in both Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and later as a major port city in the Turkish Republic, Istanbul raises these citizenship issues in rather complex and profound ways. Istanbul began its life as an occidental city and was transformed into an oriental city. It therefore articulates both elements. During both the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, Istanbul was undoubtedly a cosmopolitan city, home to diverse ethnic, religious, and language groups. After the birth of the Turkish Republic, Istanbul occupied an ambiguous position as a symbol of imperial power while Ankara became the symbol of republican order. Between the 1920s and 1980s, Istanbul was of secondary importance to the project of nation building and the formation of a national, Western, secular, Turkish identity. Since the 1980s, however, with economic globalization (liberalization and the transition from import substitution to export-led production in Turkey), Istanbul became the nation’s center of globalized consumption, production, and exchange.

With these complex transformations, Istanbul defies simplistic sociological and political categories with which we consider citizenship. The usual and foundational distinctions between oriental and occidental or between civil, political, and social forms of citizenship are thrown into disarray. The aim of this chapter, however, is not to argue that Istanbul is an exception that proves the rule. Rather, it argues that the postmodernization and globalization of Istanbul with its articulation into global flows challenges our conceptions of citizenship in an acute and a very significant way. Take, for example, the issue whether concepts generated by Western social scientists for Western societies can be fruitfully used to explore Istanbul, which is ostensibly an Eastern society. While this issue forces us to reconsider orientalism in the social sciences, as we shall see, the distinction is not an easy one to maintain. The chapter, therefore, opens with a brief discussion of the orientalist theories that located uniqueness of the Orient in terms of citizenship, and their most recent reincarnation. While this distinction has been rejected on many grounds, recently it has also become the founding principle of new forms of orientalism. The following section considers whether orientalism can even grasp the nineteenth century Istanbul with its hybrid forms
of urban citizenship and municipal government. After a description of Kemalism and the project of the modern Turkish nation-state with its roots in the nineteenth century reform movements of the Ottoman Empire, the chapter illustrates the conflicts and contradictions in the foundations of the project, particularly its hypermodern implementation of secularism and sovereignty. While these faults remained relatively benign throughout the twentieth century, still, it required three military interventions to contain their consequences. With the more recent military-led and IMF-OECD-World Bank-sponsored liberalization, these faults have become more visible and have created conditions for the questioning of sovereignty by a major Kurdish movement and of secularism by further Islamization of politics. Istanbul is at the political, if not geographic, center of these transformations in which conflicting paths of citizenship offered both by Islamization and globalization become acutely visible, which is the focus of this chapter.

**ORIENTALISM, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE CITY**

The interpretation that citizenship is essentially an occidental institution and that it distinguishes the West from oriental civilizations can be traced to orientalist discourse in the late nineteenth century. As studies by Edward Said (1978, 1993) and Bryan Turner (1974, 1978, 1994) and the subsequent postcolonial studies have illustrated, orientalism as both a discipline and an outlook dominated nineteenth century European and American attitudes toward the societies outside them, especially those based on Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism. When compared with other world-religions and civilizations, however, Islam has had the unique if dubious distinction of having always been regarded by the West as a cultural “other,” an adversary. While rivalry over exclusive claim to a one and indivisible transcendent God, the share of their respective Holy Land, and their geographic proximity partially explain this relationship, the Western civilization has become dependent upon this other to articulate its own identity. As Hoogvelt (1997) argued, as much as “orientalism” may be a product of Western culture, which Said illustrated, it is also a product of its search for itself. For Hoogvelt it is this dependency that perhaps explains the West’s special fear of Islam. Be that as it may, in the intertwining histories of the West and Islam, the nineteenth century stands apart with the emergence of orientalism as a special discipline and outlook that inexorably fixes on the difference of Islam as the anchor that defines the nature of the West. While buttressing the confidence of Europe in its own cultural superiority, orientalism cast Islam in the role of contemptible victim, in need of correction. The discipline linked itself up with broader interpretations that explained the trajectories of Islam on the basis of race, language, and religion.

If orientalism were merely a historical matter, it would remain a rather innocuous and benign curiosity. But both in the beginning and at the end of the twentieth century orientalism penetrated into social-scientific theories of modernization and democratization. Max Weber became the main protagonist using orientalism to explain the difference between the Orient and the Occident.
For Said, “Weber’s studies . . . blew him (perhaps unwittingly) into the very territory originally charted and claimed by Orientalists. There he found encouragement amongst all those nineteenth century thinkers who believed that there was a sort of ontological difference between Eastern and Western economic (as well as religious) ‘mentalities’” (Said 1978: 259). For Turner, “At the centre of Weber’s view of Islamic society is a contrast between the rational and systematic character of Occidental society, particularly in the fields of law, science, and industry and the arbitrary, unstable political and economic conditions of Oriental civilizations, particularly the Islamic” (Turner 1974: 14). Weber made this distinction between the occidental and the oriental civilizations at various levels, not necessarily consistent with each other. But whatever the level, Weber was concerned with explaining the rise of capitalism in the West and its “lack” in the East. Islam and patrimonialism were two running themes of his considerations of the difference between the two.

While orientalism has been discussed at some length in the literature, what is less emphasized is that for Weber citizenship was the institution that came to explain the difference between the Orient and the Occident. For Weber while Christianity played a fundamental part in the development of the associational character of occidental city, Islam impeded the development of such a character with its emphasis on clan and kinship (Turner 1974: 97). While in oriental cities one finds a collection of distinct and separate clan and tribal groups, which do not join common action, Christianity helped break tribalism in Europe. “The internal development of a rich and autonomous guild and associational life within the city was closely connected with the legal and political freedom of the city from interference from patrimonial or feudal officials. Not only were cities legal persons, they were also independent political agents” (Turner 1974: 97). They fought wars, concluded treaties, and made alliances. Their autonomy was fundamentally connected with their military independence. It was in the city that urban piety, legal autonomy, occupational associations, and political involvement developed; hence, the autonomous city had very important connections with the rise of European capitalism. In Islam, Weber argued, “it was the combination of a warrior religiosity with patrimonialism which limited the growth of autonomous cities and which in consequence precluded the growth of urban piety within the lower middle classes” (Turner 1974: 98).

For Weber, therefore, the oriental city-states “lacked” a concept and status of citizenship. While some rights did exist in oriental cities, citizenship as a status or concept was “absent.” That Weber wanted with this difference to explain why capitalism and its distinctive rationality emerged in the occident need not concern us here (Turner 1996: 257–86). But how Weber explained this “absence” is of consequence for considering citizenship in “oriental” societies. For Weber did not stop at the level of religious difference but claimed that citizenship was “absent” in the Orient because of the persistence and omnipotence of theocratic rule. That oriental cities were centralized and hierarchical would not allow for the rise of citizenship. The necessity of irrigation and water regulation in Mesopotamia, Egypt,
India, and China, which required financing and coordinating large projects and disciplining masses of laborers, forced the development of a governing class responsible for these activities (Weber 1909). These large-scale undertakings enabled the kings to control the military and administration. The soldiers were simply the officers of the royal army and the subjects were dominated by the monopoly of this force. In other words, the rule of the king and the royal bureaucracy was, though not total, omnipotent. Under such conditions, although certain rights were secured by the subjects, neither an association of subjects as citizens nor a special status for them was possible (Weber 1921: 1261). For Weber citizenship embodied and expressed this unique aspect of the occidental city.

Orientalism has, therefore, connected cities and citizenship in a theoretical framework in which the absence of associational solidarities became an explanatory factor for “lacking” capitalism and hence “progress.” It formed the foundation of modernization theories later in the century that associated “underdevelopment” with religion and authoritarianism and “development” with secularism and democracy. Throughout the twentieth century, modernization theories anticipated that the underdeveloped states, with secularization, rationalization, and democratization, were on the linear path to industrialization and urbanization and hence modernization. While both alternative theories and the actual trajectories taken by non-Western states in the second half of the twentieth century have discredited these theories, they still form the bedrock of how we think about the world of states. Moreover, while postmodernization and globalization may have made orientalist theories of modernization and secularization redundant, a new wave of neo-orientalist discourse emerged at the end of the twentieth century. The new orientalism explains the absence of democratic regimes in Muslim states, for example, with an essential incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Islam is said to nurture group solidarities that are incompatible with universal ideas of democracy and citizenship. For Sadowski (1997) an irony with neo-orientalist discourse is that while orientalism focussed on the “absence” of associations that explained underdevelopment, neo-orientalism is focusing on the cultural essences such as the persistence of solidarities to illustrate why societies based on these can never become democratic or civilized (Sadowski 1997: 41). Another irony is, of course, democratic theorists such as Iris Marion Young have become influential precisely because they argue that behind the claims to universality, modern democratic citizenship fostered group privileges (Young 1989). To understand these complex processes, it is not, therefore, enough to critique orientalism and neo-orientalism as theories. We need genealogies that empirically explore their effects in historically and geographically specific circumstances that link up with contemporary trajectories.

ORIENTALISM AND THE OTTOMAN ISTANBUL

Leaving aside the objections that the occidental cities did not dissolve clan and tribal ties purely and totally in the way Weber envisaged and the historicism of
Istanbul’s Conflicting Paths to Citizenship

orientalism (Isin 2001), does the Ottoman administration conform to the distinction between the occidental and oriental cities? It is worthwhile to explore briefly this question. While it is true that the Ottoman cities never explicitly articulated a conception of citizenship expressed in the autonomy of cities, there are other historical reasons for this than Ottoman centralism or the inability to dissolve clan and kinship ties. First, the Ottoman cities evolved right from the beginning in the context of a highly developed and extensive imperial government and administration and thus were not under pressure to constitute themselves as politically and legally autonomous corporations (Kafadar 1995; Karpat 1974; Köprülü 1992). The inhabitants of Istanbul were already Ottoman subjects and were entitled, in law and in custom, to certain property and associative rights (Gerber 1994; Quataert and Inalcik 1994). Second, Ottoman cities did develop various merchant and craft guilds, religious and political associations, and articulated a complex combination of attributes that resulted in a unique status for the urban dweller (Faroqhi 1984). That this status was not expressed in the occidental language of citizenship should not lead us to believe in its absence as an institution.

Beyond these reasons, however, there is a third reason, which is perhaps even more damaging to the orientalist thought about urban citizenship. Ottoman cities and their administration did not evolve in isolation from the contacts imperial elite and rulers developed over the years with occidental states and their systems of law and administration. As early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ottoman officials were already developing a positive view of the absolutist states and their urban administration, with which they could easily find affinities and parallels (Christensen 1990). Moreover, the administration of cities in absolutist Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was nowhere close to Weber’s ideal type and it is remarkable that Weber chose to remain entirely silent about the “absence” of citizenship in the absolutist state of early modern Europe (Friedrichs 1995).

By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was obvious to Ottoman intelligentsia and there were various reform movements to restructure the Ottoman state and its institutions (Göçek 1996; Kasaba 1988; Quataert 1983). Not surprisingly, municipal reform increasingly occupied an important place in these efforts and several models were experimented with, especially in Istanbul (Çadirci 1991). As Rosenthal (1980) has illustrated, a municipal council introduced in Galata District in the nineteenth century, while it eventually failed, constituted a major experiment to implement Western-style municipal government in the Ottoman Empire. The traditional administration of Istanbul, which persisted until the mid-nineteenth century, was based not on the rights and duties of citizenship understood in the modern sense, but on a social system of disconnected, self-contained, and largely autonomous groups. It was through membership of groups such as guilds or religious communities that the status of town dweller was defined and taxes were paid, obligations of membership were imposed, and rights exercised
Engin F. Isin

(Rosenthal 1980: 33). The role of the central government was largely limited to the work of judges (kadís), the patrols of the police, and the demands of the tax collector. Even in the comparatively rare instances when the government impinged on the life of the residents of Istanbul, it usually did so through an intermediary such as the guild chiefs or the head of a millet. How Istanbul was administered was remarkably similar to the maelstrom of corporations that dominated especially the medieval north European city, which also had to contend with powerful states (Nicholas 1997a; 1997b).

While Ottoman administration did not immediately follow major municipal reforms in England, America, and France in the 1830s and 1840s that established cities as self-governing polities (Isin 1992), by the 1850s there was a reform experiment in Istanbul. Galata was a district dominated by the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. In 1859, with the hopes of creating a common Ottoman citizenship, the Ottoman government ceded significant autonomy and financial resources to the district and constituted it as a municipal corporation with a council and municipal machinery. As Rosenthal (1980: 193–5) argues, while the experiment failed to create a model of common Ottoman citizenship (the municipality was abolished by 1872), its direct influence on subsequent Ottoman municipal history was far-reaching. Moreover, the district illustrates not only the willingness of Ottoman intelligentsia to experiment with modern occidental institutions of citizenship but also how difficult it was to impose a modern occidental national citizenship on Ottoman subjects who were Christians, Muslims, Turks, European proteges, and foreigners. Nonetheless, by the opening decades of the twentieth century neither municipal nor imperial reforms were able to avoid the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

These elements—advanced imperial administration, advanced commerce, and guild structures, and early encounters and hybridization with Western municipal institutions—severely limit the orientalist interpretation as a framework either to understand the fundamental differences between the Occident and the Orient or to explain why capitalism did not emerge in the latter. Orientalism becomes even more limited when it layers certain expectations on the consequences of modernization that followed the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of the modern Turkish Republic.

ISTANBUL FROM OTTOMAN COSMOPOLITANISM TO KEMALIST REPUBLICANISM

That the modern Turkish republic was born of the ashes of the mighty Ottoman Empire that had dominated Europe, Asia, and Africa for centuries is well known. What is less known is that a movement, the Young Turks, laid its foundations well before the republic was declared according to Kemalist principles (Kemal being himself a Young Turk) in 1923. In the 1890s the Ottoman Empire was defined by the European states as the “Eastern Question”—the complex series of strategic conundrums surrounding the fate of the entire Ottoman Empire—
and new states were emerging in the Balkans such as Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania from the remains of the Empire. The movement of Young Turks, mainly led by émigré army officers educated in European cities, mostly Paris, against the ramshackle imperial system, was laying the foundations of a secular, modern nation-state, modeled after European nation-states (Keyder 1987: 49–70). Many of the leaders of the movement were from Macedonia, one of the most economically prosperous and European segments of the Empire. They were also mostly educated and trained in the European-influenced schools and traditions and were divided between European liberalism and nationalism as a recipe for the post-Ottoman constitutional order (Hanioglu 1995; Kayali 1997; Ramsaur 1957).

While the Young Turks were unable to halt the disintegration of the Empire and rescue the “sick man of Europe,” despite a revolution in 1908, their legacy played a significant role in the future of the country. The most obvious was, of course, a future leader and founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal who became the military and political leader of a movement that culminated in the birth of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The new nation envisaged itself as secular, modern, and Western with an industrial future against the background of the Islamic, imperial, and quasifeudal past. The contradictions and dilemmas that tear Turkey apart today can be in part traced to the closing days of the nineteenth century and the opening decades of the twentieth century. A new nationalism and republicanism were being forged to which Mustafa Kemal eventually gave his name and stamp as their heir. (The depiction of Mustafa Kemal as the Mother Turk who invented modern Turkey with his genius was a myth generated after the formation of the republic as part of its national identity.)

 Atatürk and Kemalism—a set of ideas or ideals with which he is associated—has a powerful presence in the Turkish psyche. When Time magazine editors made an international call for the man of the century, they were surprised how many Turks inundated their inboxes with a confident and irreverent reply that there was no doubt in their minds as to who the man of this century was. Yet, while the portraits, busts, and sculptures of Atatürk dominate the Turkish landscape, Kemalism was a contested and fractured movement and it remains that way today. Its dominant position in the media, government, and military ideology and the popular imagination belie the fact that there are conflicting and contesting interpretations of Kemalism in modern Turkey. These contradictory and ambivalent elements are also embedded in the person who was the ostensible founder of the movement. Mustafa Kemal was born and raised in a cosmopolitan European city, Salonika, and his parents had more European lineage and sensibilities than many Turks would care to admit. The streets of Salonika were full of Ladino-speaking Jews, Slav speakers from the northern Balkans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Romanians, Albanians, Vlachs, Armenians, and Gypsies. As well, being a trading center, it brought in numerous different people and professions. While Atatürk is regarded as the ultimate Turk who came from the East and swept away the invading British, Greek, Italian, and French forces to found the modern Turkish Republic, his origins were not in Turkey, let alone eastern
Turkey, but Europe. He may even have had some Albanian or Slav blood among his ancestors. Finally, his piercing blue eyes and blonde hair constitute perfect symbols of Western modernization rather than an Ottoman past. But his legacy and the reforms he instigated are open to interpretation and have been differently appropriated by various dominant groups in the country throughout the latter part of the twentieth century.

The republican reforms for modernization—secularization and modernization of the state, abolishing the Arabic script and the introduction of the Latin alphabet, literacy campaigns, the end of the reign of religious leaders, and the introduction of Western dress codes—are seen as the effective end of the Ottoman rule in Turkey. Following the manifesto of the single party that ruled Turkey under the leadership of Atatürk until the 1950s, the six elements of Kemalism—republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism—did not include democracy (Ahmad 1993; Zürcher 1993). Secularism and nationalism had been among the distinctive characteristics of the Young Turk movement. But during the 1930s both were carried to their extremes, secularism being interpreted not only as a separation of state and religion, but as the removal of religion from public life and the establishment of complete state control over remaining religious institutions. An extreme form of nationalism, with the attendant creation of historical myths, was used as the prime instrument in the building of a Turkish national identity, and as such was intended to take the place of religion in many respects. Republican citizenship meant a commitment to a constitutional order against the return of the Ottoman monarchical rule. It did not mean a democratic republicanism with free and multiparty elections, freedom of speech and expression, and freedom of association. On the contrary, Kemalist Turkey was ruled in the 1930s and 1940s with an iron hand, resembling authoritarian states, especially that of Fascist Italy in the 1930s, rather than a democratic state. Populism meant national solidarity and placing the interests of the nation before those of any group or class. According to Kemalism there were no social classes in Turkey in the sense European nations had them. Revolutionism meant the continuance of reforms to rid the nation of its Ottoman past until no traces of it were left. Finally, statism was a very significant aspect of Kemalism, which regarded the state not only as a guardian of but also an active player in the economic field. It is of vital importance to understand that Kemalism positioned itself against both capitalism and socialism. It was its defining aspect to embark upon a program of nationalization (acquisition of railway companies, agricultural sectors, and creation of state monopolies) and liberalization (allowing selective foreign investment) simultaneously.

What is important from the point of view of Istanbul is that it occupied an ambiguous position in the new republican order. In the ethos of the nationalist discourse, Istanbul became the symbolic vestige of the corrupt Ottoman cosmopolitanism. The new valorization of the Anatolian peasant as the core of the new state was coupled with the identification of commerce with profiteering. Ankara thus became not only the symbol of political power in the new republic.
but also a symbol of the new national economy and the site of the emergence of a secular, bureaucratic elite. Until the 1960s, Istanbul continually lost prominence to Ankara and experienced only moderate population and economic growth by postwar Turkish standards (Keyder and Öncü 1994: 392–3). Ankara became the symbol of a balanced approach to economic growth, allowing limited foreign direct investment, encouraging import-substitution, nationalization of major services in transportation and communications, and developing a program of national production symbolized in national monopolies. While citizenship did not feature explicitly, nor was the regime prepared to experiment with, democratic rights, underlying Kemalism was a strong sense of national identity and belonging, and guarantees that came with that belonging. Kemalism was then a delicate, if not effective, balance of competing forces that threatened to tear apart the young republic, with its contradictory roots in Islam and expansionism expressed in Turan and its precarious situation in the world economy and polity (Karpat 1973; Weiker 1981).

It was this balance that was threatened with the onset of the Cold War and the rising interest of the United States in Turkey after the Second World War. Turkey increasingly found itself drawn to the orbit of American capitalism, and foreign policy, the state, and the army were increasingly articulated as the guardians of a new kind of Kemalism (Keyder 1987). Beginning with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the World Bank and IMF (backed by the United States) began increasingly influencing Turkish economic policy. Throughout the remainder of the 1940s and 1950s, the statism of Kemalism was already slowly being replaced with economic liberalization and political oppression. Every movement that questioned this secularist alignment was brutally and violently suppressed, with major military coups and interventions in 1960 and 1971. While the 1960 coup and the resultant new constitution introduced some civil and political rights, they did not live long and were suspended by martial law in 1970. These interventions showed how far the interpretation of Kemalism had shifted from its original principles. While Kemalism extolled the virtues of sovereignty and independence, these military interventions increasingly brought Turkey into the orbit of Western capitalism and made Turkey the cornerstone of American expansionism against the Soviet Union. Yet, the paradoxical consequence of being brought into the orbit of American capitalism and accepting the policies of the World Bank and IMF also meant the gradual weakening of the state, without a corresponding strengthening of a civil society. While the 1960 and 1971 interventions remained rather limited, neoliberalism was instituted by a total revolution by the military in 1980.

**GLOBALIZATION, IDENTITIES, AND PROJECTS: ISLAMIZATION OF POLITICS**

To assert that the republican modernization project failed in Turkey is too simplistic. For it seems that the trajectory of globalization that Turkey followed
since 1980 paralleled the trajectories followed by other states as diverse as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan (Hoogvelt 1997). There has been a general trend from import-substitution developmental projects to neoliberal deregulation, privatization, and market-led reforms. That these neoliberal policies have resulted in different consequences for each state is beyond doubt, but to explain the turn toward neoliberalism with the ostensible failure of modernization without taking into account broader economic, cultural, and political globalization is inadequate. Accordingly, that the 1980 military coup in Turkey coincides with the major takeoff moment of globalization is perhaps less a symbol of the failure of modernization than a signal of a structural readjustment. It is a telling fact that while the coup gave the military leaders a grip on power to begin a political cleansing, their attention turned astonishingly rapidly toward economic liberalization and modernization. Throughout the remainder of the 1980s, while the military loosened its grip on political power and allowed “democratic” elections, the elected governments continued the program of rapid economic liberalization (Ahmad 1993: 181–212; Zürcher 1993: 292–6).

Throughout the 1980s, the linchpins of Kemalism, the strong state and import substitution, were replaced with a weak state involvement in the economy and export-led growth, driven by foreign direct investment, the opening up of markets, and the dismantling of regulations and public sector producers. By the end of the 1980s, the coup succeeded in its aims. Having effectively dismantled and suppressed civil and political rights, the regime implemented an entirely different set of economic policies than Kemalism. While all this was done under the banner of protecting the legacy of Atatürk, the military-induced neoliberalism in Turkey was a fragile interpretation of Kemalism that, while emphasizing his European aspirations, ignored his insistence on statism. Within a few years the Kemalist legacy of strong state institutions and monopolies was nearly dismantled, trade protections lifted, many regulations abandoned, and the Turkish money and commodity markets opened to foreign investors and products. While the results were devastating for some, especially in the large public sector, they also created a new, secular, middle class, a parvenu class, whose fortunes and mentalities were more integrated with American and European sensibilities and lifestyles than any other social group Turkey had ever experienced. The Turkish economic liberalization program and its consequences are well documented (Nas and Odekon 1988, 1992; Togan and Balasubramanyam 1996). Istanbul played a special role in this program, which requires further discussion.

That Istanbul has experienced these transformations in globalization more than any other city in Turkey is not surprising. But that Istanbul became virtually synonymous with globalization in Turkey as the vanguard of all those transformations reveals that the city played a qualitatively different role from a typical postwar economic engine. For Keyder and Öncü (1994) Istanbul was the center of the ambitious liberalization program embarked upon by postmilitary governments after 1983. It is in this interpretation that Istanbul begins to reveal new regimes of regulation for these governments that created new financial sources, allowed
the opening of a stock exchange market, created a new metropolitan government, and transformed the city into a competitive global city-region. They also embarked upon policies to mitigate the negative effects of liberalization in Istanbul, especially on the public sector employees and their dependants. They adopted a populist approach toward squatter settlements, which made up between 60 and 75 percent of the overall residential settlement in Istanbul. Their dwellers were allowed legally to convert their low-density houses to multistory apartment buildings, which created opportunities for attaining instant wealth by selling these properties to “developers.” Within a decade a radical transformation from low-density squatter settlements to relatively high-density shantytowns with substandard housing radically transformed Istanbul. While public sector workers endured a decline in real wages, and those in the marginal sector suffered both from decreasing employment opportunities and lower wages, deregulation of the residential property market provided opportunities to more or less the same population via their new ownership of houses in shantytowns. For Keyder and Öncü (1994) this was the essence of the urban populism of neoliberalism.

Furthermore, the significant increase in foreign direct investment and the arrival of, first, the headquarters of major multinational corporations, then, major producer-service firms in accounting, advertising, marketing, fashion, design, and entertainment, and finally the dramatic rise of the hospitality industry, transformed Istanbul. New wealth engendered new social groups. While the public sector professions such as teachers, writers, bureaucrats, trade unionists, suffered an identity crisis and loss of public confidence, the new private sector professions in engineering, journalism, marketing, and advertising experienced a dramatic growth of confidence (Göle 1993). The spatial organization of the city changed dramatically as well. While its traditional polarization between the rich and the poor increased, it was obvious that the new rich were those connected with the internationalized and liberalized economy. The regeneration and renovation of the historic core of the city for both the tourist industry and the new chic quarters of the wealthy continued as poverty was increasingly suburbanized further and further out from the city.

Of relevance for us is the fact that while new groups in the city developed a new sense of ownership of the city, both symbolically and materially, they also engendered new forms of alienation and marginalization, especially of recent migrants from Anatolia. Their sense of belonging and entitlement were very different from those of the new, Western, elite that began shaping Istanbul in its own image. For many social groups westernization and modernization—hence globalization though the vocabulary is hardly vernacular—increasingly and obviously meant marginalization, impoverishment, and outright abandonment. Islamization of politics as a credible world view among them and its articulation of an alternative development path bypassing westernization must be seen against that background. But it must also be seen against a broader background of political and economic change that allowed Islam to make its case to the Turkish electorate.
To speak of Islamization of politics is more accurate than an Islamist revival or resurgence since the 1970s in Turkey. For Islam has always been present as a political force in the republican order (Göle 1996). Nonetheless, that it has become increasingly prominent in electoral politics and won major electoral victories in the 1990s has usually been explained by immiseration of lower and middle classes from neoliberal policies and the inability of the modernization project to deliver political and economic stability (Margulies and Yıldızoğlu 1997). While undoubtedly useful, these explanations, however, reveal vestiges of orientalism and forms of new orientalism. They assume that if political and economic stability were on offer to the lower and middle classes, Islam would lose its attraction. The complex ways in which Islamist politics appeal to various groups and how postmodernization and globalization relay these complex identifications belie such explanations. Many Western observers, for example, especially those who would like to see Turkey admitted into the European Union, consider the rise of Islamist politics in Turkey as a temporary setback to the secular and nationalist project of Kemalism. But, the roots of Islam in Turkey are far deeper than capitalism, westernism, or even secularism (Akpinar 1993). With the unexpected decline of the socialist and communist ideals in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Islam emerged as a real and credible alternative for many Turks to the Kemalism of the army and the secular elite. There are three other reasons that account for Islamization of politics as an instance of postmodernization and globalization of Istanbul rather than an ostensible revival of Islamic jihad against a McWorld (Barber 1995).

The first reason concerns the Eastern European revolutions in 1989, which could not have come at a worse time for the secular Turkish elite. Turkey had applied to become a member of the European Union in 1987. Just when it was preparing for its final admission—a long and protracted story that goes back to the 1950s—the emphasis of both Europe and America had already shifted rather rapidly to the new zones liberated from communism and their transition to capitalism. In the frenzy of the billions of dollars that American and European capitalism invested in the formerly communist states, Turkey had become overnight the “forgotten man of Europe.” The reasons for the protracted battle to be European are too complex to enter into here. Official reasons such as human rights violations are less important than the strategic regional interests of the United States, which would like to keep Turkey outside the European Union, and of Europe, which would like to keep Turkey as its isolated other (Keyder 1993). Be that as it may, the protracted battle to be European in the wake of a weakening state unable to provide social security gradually destabilized the fragile balance between secularism and nationalism and opened the way to the Islamization of politics (Ayata 1993; Davison 1998; Toprak 1981). To put it another way, neoliberalism, dressed up as Kemalism, was not sufficiently convincing to many groups to provide them with an adequate sense of identity (Keyder 1995). Islamist politics provided an alternative to Western-style consumerism, as a source of identity, belonging, and identification.
The second reason concerns the tragic Gulf War in 1991–92. This not only left Turkey with a trade deficit of billions of dollars in fulfilling its NATO “obligation,” but also placed stress on the political fault line between the West and the Muslim states. As soon as the prospect of war with Iraq over the invasion of Kuwait loomed, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. This meant the important pipeline exporting Iraqi oil running through Turkey had to be closed, at an estimated cost of $250 million a year. Iraq was also an important market for Turkish agricultural exports. Although the alliance led by the United States explicitly promised to meet the cost of these measures, it never did so, and many Turkish companies went bankrupt and the Turkish economy was hit very badly. This was a turning point in the emergence of Islam as a political force in politics in that it illustrated vividly who the masters of Turkey were in international relations. Aligning with the West against another Muslim country and its people and culture made it clear, if anyone had any doubts, that in the New World Order, Turkey was subjected to the rules set by Western, especially American, policies.

A third reason for Islamization of politics in Turkey was the impact of the military coup on associations, unions, and organizations that followed a leftist politics, especially in large cities such as Istanbul and Ankara. For in installing Western hypercapitalism by force and dismantling civil and political liberties such as free speech, expression, and association so absolutely that an independent and associational life became stultified and stale, the cultural imagination was left open to Islam. Islam has become credible among the critical middle classes precisely because, especially in its moderate versions, it provides an alternative to Western subjugation and modernization, and a link to tradition and history. The left, which was so effectively dismantled by the military, had previously been able to provide an alternative vision, borrowing elements both from Kemalism and secularism and even from Islam.

Still, despite the merits of explanations that highlight immiseration of lower and middle classes from neoliberalism and the inability of the modernization project to deliver political and economic stability, shifting identities of the Turkish people due to the 1989 revolutions and the Gulf War and the disappearance of the left tend to underestimate the organizational skills of Islamist politics as an urban movement. That Islamization of politics may be an instance of post-modernization and globalization of Istanbul and may be offering a new path to citizenship should be considered seriously.

ISLAMIC CITIZENSHIP

While these accounts contextualize the rise of Islamist politics in Turkey, still, without understanding its organization, ideologies, and sources of identity, it is impossible to understand let alone come to terms with it. Islamization of politics in Turkey can be understood as the emergence of an urban social movement that is compatible with notions of democracy and citizenship rather
than displaying immutable and essential fundamentalisms that relegate it to marginal and fringe politics. To be sure, Islamization of politics takes various forms, from fundamentalist to moderate and progressive currents, but this is not any different from any urban or social movement that characterizes postmodernization of politics in the West. Similarly, deepening democracy and strengthening progressive aspects of these movements requires taking their claims seriously and recognizing their legitimacy. This is impossible to do if one adheres to a perspective that sees an immutable incompatibility between Islam and democracy, either because of the absence of associational solidarities (orientalism) or their strong presence (new orientalism). From such a perspective, Islamic citizenship is impossible precisely because Islam is considered incompatible with democracy (Esposito and Voll 1996; Krämer 1997; Nielsen 1992; Sadowski 1997).

As more studies conclude that Islamization appeals to various groups not because it offers a jihad mentality but because it offers practical and reasonable choices in people's everyday lives it becomes more difficult to sustain an interpretation that casts the Islamic revival as a movement against modernity and democracy. Practical Islamic politics are concerned with issues such as poverty, the environment, transportation, people's conduct of their public selves, consumption, and neighborhood protection. When in 1994 the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) won 19 percent of the popular vote and captured twenty-six of the seventy-two metropolitan municipalities in the country, including Istanbul and Ankara, the entire secular establishment was deeply concerned. When this was followed by a national election victory in 1995 in which the RP became the largest party and eventually formed the government, Western commentators and observers joined the panic. The political geography of the 1995 general election provided some evidence for this concern. Over the great mass of central and eastern Anatolia, Refah was the largest party, with Islamist victories stretching to the heart of Istanbul, not only in the poor working-class and underclass suburbs but also in fashionable districts. Islamists organize very effectively through municipal institutions, as witnessed by their persistent victories in local elections, and have become a major part of Turkish political life. The irony of maintaining democracy via undemocratic measures was not lost on Islamist intellectuals when, in 1997, the army through the National Security Council delivered an ultimatum to the Islamist government to resign because of its failure to uphold secularism. While the party was closed down in 1998, it was reincarnated in time for the 1999 general elections in which it succeeded remarkably well by gaining 15 percent of the popular vote as the third largest party in parliament.

Behind these electoral successes is a grassroots organization that uses a network of mosques and Islamic brotherhoods and operates at the neighborhood level. While mounting legitimate and serious criticism of globalization and the Western path to citizenship, the Islamic organization operates at the level of people's everyday experiences and provides alternative sources of identity and identification to consumerism, westernization, and capitalism (Göle 1997; Gülalp
Simultaneously, rather than refusing globalization as such, it presents an alternative path to globalization by looking eastward and envisaging Turkey as part of a global Islam.

### CONCLUSION

Islamization of politics in Istanbul and its articulation of an Islamic citizenship are neither ephemeral nor necessarily a fundamentalist phenomena. The project of westernization and modernization already rested on fragile grounds and with the globalization and postmodernization of Istanbul these grounds became even more fragile and made possible the articulation of various identities and projects that compete with dominant nationalist narratives. While the secular elite is divided between those who look to the West to articulate a vision of modern citizenship based upon the state and those who look to civil society and market institutions, other social groups, among them Islamists, are articulating alternative forms of identity and citizenship that look eastward (Toprak 1996). The fact that Turkey now finds it difficult to secure acceptance by the West helps the Islamist leaders and intellectuals to articulate a vision of Turkish citizenship without incorporating these contradictions from the West (Ayata 1993; Heyd 1968; Tapper 1991; Toprak 1993).

Some Islamic intellectuals have articulated the choices available to the Turkish Republic as the “city of virtue” that Islam represents against an “empire of consumerism” that the West represents (Mehmet 1990; Toprak 1993). To them the virtuous path of Islam is far superior to a path towards narcissistic consumption, elevating it into a form of fundamentalism, which is all too visible on the streets of Istanbul. To interpret the Islamization of politics in Istanbul and the paths to citizenship it provides it is clear that the orientalist and neo-orientalist dualities between occidental and the oriental forms of citizenship will be inadequate. The ostensibly occidental institutions of citizenship already existed in Istanbul before modernity and the modernization of its constitution and citizenship left a complex legacy of citizenship that cannot be captured by orientalist concepts. Accordingly, understanding visions of citizenship offered by Islamic thought must be taken seriously to come to terms with a globalizing Istanbul.

### REFERENCES


Istanbul’s Conflicting Paths to Citizenship


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